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Kurdish nationalism has been a central issue in domestic Turkish politics since the 
founding of the republic nearly a century ago. Since 1984, the insurgency waged by the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has claimed the lives of tens of thousands citizens on 
both sides of the conflict. While Ankara has largely attempted to address the “Kurdish 
question” via military and security measures, unprecedented negotiations in the last year 
have raised hopes that a peace settlement may finally be within reach. While some 
observers are fearful that this round of talks will be yet another failed attempt to end the 
violence, this thesis seeks to explore whether recent changes in Turkey’s social and 
political landscape have increased the likelihood of a lasting resolution. The research is 
framed as a historical survey of critical political events and public discourse from 
prominent politicians and public figures, relying on a mix of primary and secondary 
sources. This thesis argues that three domestic shifts have indeed helped set the stage for 
a lasting solution: increased political opportunities for Kurdish activists, the end of 
military tutelage in security affairs, and the reframing of Turkish nationalism through the 
assertion of Ottoman-Islamic identity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Kurdish nationalism has served as a fundamental political challenge for the 
Republic of Turkey since its founding in 1923. In response to the secular and 
modernizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal, Kurds in the country’s southeastern region rose 
up in rebellion 17 times between 1924 and 1938.1 Although nationalist aspirations were 
effectively suppressed by Ankara for the next four decades, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, PKK) launched an insurgency in 1984 with the objective of 
forming an independent Kurdish state. In the three decades since, the bloody conflict has 
claimed nearly 40 thousand lives and internally displaced over over one million citizens.2 
After the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the organization declared a 
ceasefire and withdrew most of its forces to northern Iraq, leading many to declare the 
movement defeated. Five years later, however, the PKK resumed its guerilla and terror 
tactics, and death tolls have been rising ever since. 
Since the early rebellions, the state has handled the challenge of Kurdish 
nationalist militancy as a security problem that could be solved through force. While 
denying the existence of Kurdish ethnicity, Ankara claimed that the PKK had little 
sympathy amongst ordinary citizens and that terror attacks were motivated by 
socioeconomic problems or incited by meddling foreign powers. Since 2002, the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has adopted a 
comparatively moderate approach to the “Kurdish question.” Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan has acknowledged past mistakes on the part of the state and presided 
over reforms that have increased Kurdish language and education rights. Nonetheless, 
Erdogan has largely failed to articulate a consistent approach to the problem, and PKK 
                                                 
1 Omer Taspinar, Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
79. 
2 Some estimates exceed two million. Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: 
From Protest to Resistance (London: Routledge, 2012), 131; International Crisis Group, Turkey: Ending 
The PKK Insurgency—Europe Report No. 213 (Brussels: ICG, 2011), 4.  
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violence has worsened significantly during his tenure. In March 2013, after 
unprecedented meetings between Ocalan and state representatives, the PKK again 
declared a ceasefire and withdrawal, leading some to speculate that a negotiated end to 
the conflict may finally be possible. 
In looking at the recent history of Ankara’s struggle against militant Kurdish 
nationalism, important research questions arise: Have there been fundamental shifts in 
Turkey’s political institutions that have increased the chances of finally reaching a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict? Are these changes evidence of progress toward a 
popular consensus, or merely a product of pragmatic maneuvering by political leaders? 
This thesis argues that three important shifts have laid the foundation for a non-military 
solution to Turkey’s Kurdish question: increasing political opportunities for Kurdish 
activists, the decreasing political influence of the armed forces, and the growing 
importance of political actors asserting an Ottoman-Islamic identity.      
B. IMPORTANCE  
In recent years, Turkey has strengthened its claim as an important player in global 
politics. The country’s location between Europe and the tumultuous Middle East serves 
to foster deep political, economic, and cultural connections with a host of important 
geopolitical actors. Its recent economic growth has distinguished Turkey as one of the 
strongest economies—not just in its volatile region, but worldwide.3 In the wake of the 
Arab Spring, multiple Muslim leaders singled out Turkey as a model for new regimes 
thanks to its unique synthesis of secular democracy and Islamic identity.4 As Syria’s 
neighbor and the possessor of NATO’s second-largest army, Turkey would undoubtedly 
play a major role in any intervention in that troubled country.5  
                                                 
3 “Turkey’s Economy: Istanbuls and Bears,” The Economist, April 7, 2012, http://goo.gl/WWN0qR; 
“Turkey’s Economy is Thriving in a Dangerous Neighbourhood,” Economics Blog (blog), The Guardian, 
accessed August 15, 2013, http://goo.gl/TIVunj. 
4 Gözde Nur Donat, “We Need Turkey in Post-Revolution Arab World, Morsi Says at AK Party 
Congress,” Today’s Zaman, September 30, 2012, http://goo.gl/i9RBaQ; “Ennahda Takes Turkey as Model 
for Democracy,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 27, 2011, http://goo.gl/yMY4dY.  
5 “Turkey Would Join Coalition Against Syria, Says Foreign Minister,” Reuters, August 26, 2013, 
http://goo.gl/f8U8Ef. 
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Nonetheless, the violence and insecurity surrounding Ankara’s three-decade 
struggle with Kurdish nationalism have hampered Turkey’s rising status as a regional 
power. Aside from the staggering loss of life, the conflict has consumed significant 
financial resources and hindered development of the country’s southeast region. Since 
Kurds represent significant minority populations in three of Turkey’s neighboring 
countries (and are found in large numbers throughout Europe), the challenges presented 
by Kurdish nationalism have ramifications beyond Turkish domestic politics. In multiple 
instances, Turkey has engaged in cross-border operations into northern Iraq to strike PKK 
bases despite the protests of foreign leaders. Erdogan has threatened similar attacks on 
northern Syria, where Kurdish regions have assumed autonomy in the midst of that 
country’s escalating civil war.6 The country’s bid for European Union (EU) membership 
has been complicated by concerns that Turkey’s minority rights and anti-terrorism 
measures are incompatible with European standards. In order for Turkey to achieve its 
potential as a regional leader, it must make significant strides towards ending the PKK’s 
insurgency. Rather than a cynical deal to help politicians achieve short-term political 
objectives, however, Turkey needs a lasting peace that is supported by a broad national 
consensus. This thesis seeks to explore whether changes in the country’s social and 
political milieu have increased the chances of such a resolution. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Although Turkey has been dealing with militant Kurdish nationalism for decades, 
recent government policies and statements have broken with past precedents in an 
apparently earnest effort towards achieving peace. In seeking to explain these actions, it 
is important to look at what has changed in Turkey in recent years to make such actions 
possible politically. The research presented in this thesis will assess three factors that 
have influenced Ankara’s changing approach towards the PKK and Kurdish nationalism: 
the Kurdish national movement’s increased participation in the political process, 
                                                 
6 Piotr Zalewski, “By Ceding Northeastern Syria to the Kurds, Assad Puts Turkey in a Bind,” Time, 
July 27, 2012, http://goo.gl/SEHIAF. 
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significant power shifts in domestic civil-military relations, and the increasing 
importance of Ottoman-Islamic identity in Turkish politics. 
Since 1984, the PKK has largely dictated the agenda of the Kurdish national 
movement. This has been partly due to Ocalan’s charisma and his history of brutally 
dealing with potential challengers.7 A major factor in the PKK’s hegemony, however, has 
been the limited opportunities for Kurdish activism within the state’s established political 
system. Although Ankara has permitted the creation of pro-Kurdish8 parties since 1990, 
the government has repeatedly jailed their leaders, restricted their actions, or closed them 
completely based on their alleged ties to the PKK. In recent years, however, relaxed 
restrictions on associations and political speech have improved opportunities for 
discourse amongst Kurdish activists. This has improved the relative strength of Kurdish 
political and civil groups vis-à-vis the PKK in setting the Kurdish nationalist agenda. As 
part of this reshaping, the movement’s rhetoric has discarded demands of independence 
in favor of calls for increased human and political rights. This thesis will explore how 
these changes have shaped Turkey’s national debate such that a negotiated settlement 
may be a politically acceptable.   
The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) have played an 
important role in state politics since multiparty politics began in 1950. As the 
constitutionally enshrined protector of the secular republic, the TSK has directly or 
indirectly overthrown the ruling government four times since 1960. In addition to 
resorting to regime change, the army has also leveraged its institutional power and public 
status to influence, or even dictate, a broad range of state policies. Most notably, the army 
has viewed Kurdish nationalist violence categorically as a security problem and crafted 
                                                 
7 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New 
York University, 2007), 40–42, 89–96, 134–140; İbrahim Doğan, “PKK Kills Its Outspoken Members, 
Says Kurdish Politician Güçlü,” Today’s Zaman, January 24, 2012, http://goo.gl/qsZWEq. 
8 I will adopt Nicole Watts’s imperfect term “pro-Kurdish party” to reference a legal political party 
that “publicly advocates collective Kurdish cultural and/or political rights.” As she points out, “‘Kurdish’ 
simply denotes ethnicity and contains no information about political preferences. Also, those who promote 
a pro-Kurdish agenda may be of any ethnicity.” Nicole Watts, “The Missing Moderate: Legitimacy 
Resources and Pro-Kurdish Party Politics in Turkey,” in The Kurdish Policy Imperative, ed. Robert Lowe 
and Gareth Stansfield (Washington: Chatham House, 2010), 97n1. 
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the state’s responses accordingly. Since 1999, however, the military’s power has been 
dramatically curtailed through reforms aimed at EU accession, failed showdowns with 
the increasingly popular AKP, and the conviction of hundreds of high-ranking officers on 
treason charges. This research investigates whether the shifting civil-military power 
balance has created opportunities for the government to reshape its approach to the 
political challenge presented by Kurdish nationalism. 
A great deal of pro-Kurdish discourse concerns the nature of Turkish nationalism 
and identity. In the decade after he founded of the republic, President Mustafa Kemal 
(who took the name Ataturk in 1934) mandated a top-down campaign to forge a unitary 
national identity based on shared language and culture. Ankara declared all Muslim 
citizens to be Turks, broke ties with its Ottoman past, and suppressed all expression of 
other ethnicities, including Kurdishness. Concurrently, the state’s militant secularism 
banned all religion from the public sphere. Thanks to opportunities created by economic 
and political liberalization that began in the 1980s, however, some Turkish politicians 
have increasingly emphasized their Islamic identity and Ottoman heritage when 
addressing domestic and international problems. While attempts to placate Kurdish 
nationalism by asserting that “Islam is the cement” have largely backfired, the rising 
statue of Turkey’s pious politicians has challenged exclusive concepts of national identity 
birthed by the Kemalist reforms of the early republic.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several works that are widely recognized as authoritative political 
histories of the late Ottoman Empire and the modern Republic of Turkey.9 In addition, a 
wide range of literature addresses the specific hypotheses of this thesis: Kurdish 
nationalism, Turkey’s civil-military relations, and the role of Ottoman and Islamic 
identity in Turkish nationalism.   
                                                 
9 Erik Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Feroz Ahmad, The Making of 
Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1993); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: 
Oxford University, 1969); M. Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 
Princeton University, 2008); M. Sukru Hanioglu, Ataturk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University, 2011); Soner Cagaptay, Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who 
is a Turk? (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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1. Kurdish Nationalism 
There are a handful of canonical English-language historical works that provide 
important background on the Kurdish nation. Of these, David McDowall’s A Modern 
History of the Kurds is the most ambitious, spanning from the pre-Islamic Kurdish tribes 
of Mesopotamia to the modern nationalist movements of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, 
and Iraq.10 Now in its third edition, McDowall’s work serves as a standard reference for 
those researching the Kurdish people in the context of the late Ottoman Empire and the 
nation-states that succeeded it. Wadie Jwaideh’s Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins 
and Development deals extensively with the relations between Kurdish tribes in the 19th 
and early- to mid-20th centuries, but provides excellent details of the rebellions led by 
Sheikhs Ubayd Allah and Said of Palu, two fundamental figures in the Kurdish national 
narrative.11 The Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925—one of driving forces behind the 
Kemalist repression of Kurdish identity—has been the subject of two additional volumes 
of its own, both of which argue that the famous insurrection was motivated by both 
religious and nationalist aspirations.12  
Many contemporary political history works highlight the contentious relationship 
between the modern Turkish polity and its Kurdish citizens, the authors of which 
generally fall into two camps. In the first camp are Kurdish scholars, i.e. those that 
primarily research the Kurdish nationalist movement but still devote attention to the 
political context of Turkey and its neighboring states. In the second group are scholars of 
contemporary Turkish history who have written on the Kurdish question thanks to its 
prominence in domestic politics. Amongst the Kurdish scholars, Michael Gunter is likely 
the most prolific, having authored a variety of short books, chapters, and journal articles 
                                                 
10 David McDowall, A Brief History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 
11 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University, 2006). 
12 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State (London: Zed, 1992); Robert Olson, The 
Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925 (Austin, TX: University of 
Texas, 1989). 
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that highlight the Kurds’ quest for greater political participation.13 David Romano has 
approached his research using the theoretical framework of social movement theory,14 
while Denise Natali has focused on the ethnicization and evolution of national identity.15 
Robert Olson’s works have detailed the intricacies of the national movement in Turkey in 
the 2000s, paying special attention to the role of the pro-Kurdish political parties.16 Also 
focusing on the movement parties is Nicole Watts, whose Activists in Office provides 
outstanding insight into the opportunities and restrictions presented to the People’s Labor 
Party (Halkin Emek Partisi, HEP) and its successors.17 Thanks to her controversial Blood 
and Belief, which provides the most thorough English-language description of the 
antecedents, formation, and inner workings of the PKK, Turkey’s state security courts 
charged Aliza Marcus with inciting racial hatred.18 Vera Eccarius-Kelly has also focused 
on the period since the 1980s, paying special attention to the network of PKK-linked 
European NGOs.19 Conducting his research from the perspective of discourse analysis, 
Cengiz Gunes methodically traces the evolution of the ideology, propaganda, and cultural 
rituals of the Kurdish nationalist movement.20 Although somewhat dated, Kemal Kirisci 
                                                 
13 Michael Gunter, The Kurds and Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin’s, 1997); Michael Gunter, 
The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); Michael Gunter, “Turkey: The Politics of a New Democratic Constitution,” 
Middle East Policy 19, no. 1 (2012); Michael Gunter, “Reopening Turkey’s Closed Kurdish Opening?,” 
Middle East Policy 20, no. 2 (2013). 
14 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge, 2006). 
15 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 2005). 
16 Robert Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movements in Turkey: 1980 to 2011, (Costa Mesa, CA: 
Mazda, 2011). Robert Olson, Blood, Beliefs, and Ballots: The Management of Kurdish Nationalism in 
Turkey, 2007–2009 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2009). 
17 Nicole Watts, Activists in Office: Kurdish Politics and Protest in Turkey (Seattle: University of 
Washington, 2011).  
18 Marcus, Blood and Belief. 
19 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2011). 
20 Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey. 
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and Gareth Winrow’s The Kurdish Question and Turkey frames Kurdish identity claims 
as minority rights amongst a broader international set of evolving norms.21 
Amongst the Turkish group of scholars, one of the most prolific is Metin Heper, 
who has written and edited many volumes on the country’s politics. In The State and 
Kurds in Turkey: A Question of Assimilation, he offers a weak defense of Ankara’s 
Kurdish policies, claiming that a “lack or recognition” did not equate to a denial of 
Kurdish ethnicity within Turkey or an attempt at assimilation.22 Turkey’s Kurdish 
Question, by Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, provides an excellent overview of the 
conflict prior to Ocalan’s capture, particularly with regards to the military-dominated 
state response.23 Andrew Mango, famous for writing one of the most respected English-
language biographies of Ataturk, has contributed an analysis of Turkey’s 
counterterrorism efforts, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years we Fought 
Alone; although filled with excellent factual background, the book makes no attempt to 
objectively analyze political aspects of the conflict.24 Mustafa Cosar Unal, a high-ranking 
intelligence officer within the Turkish national police, has approached the conflict from a 
data-driven analytical perspective; his Counterterrorism in Turkey attempts to tie swings 
in PKK violence directly to state policy changes, although some of his assumptions on 
causation appear questionable.25  
Amongst the scholars writing on the topic, only Watts has dedicated an entire 
volume to the importance of political participation for the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
Although some journal articles have focused on the role of the main pro-Kurdish 
                                                 
21 Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-
state Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 
22 Metin Heper, The State and Kurds in Turkey: A Question of Assimilation (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007). 
23 Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1998). 
24 Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years we Fought Alone (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
25 Mustafa Cosar Unal, Counterterrorism in Turkey: Policy Choices and Effects toward the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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parties,26 surprisingly little research has expanded the discussion to the importance of 
smaller parties and other civil-society groups that have flourished in the last decade. This 
thesis seeks to fill this gap in the research.  
2. Turkey’s Civil-military Relations 
Although a few English-language historical works focus on the importance of the 
armed forces in Turkish politics during the republican era,27 many of the most-cited 
pieces dedicated to Turkey’s civil-military relations are journal articles or chapters of 
edited volumes.28 Amongst the scholars attempting to outline explanations for the 
                                                 
26 Henri Barkey, “The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP): The Travails of a Legal Kurdish Party in 
Turkey,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no. 1 (1998): 129–138; Marlies Casier, “Designated 
Terrorists: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and its Struggle to (Re)Gain Political Legitimacy,” 
Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 3 (2010): 393–413; Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden, 
“Reassembling the Political: The PKK and the Project of Radical Democracy,” European Journal of 
Turkish Studies 14 (2012), http://ejts.revues.org/4615; Aylin Guney, “The People’s Democracy Party,” 
Turkish Studies 3, no.1 (2002): 122–137; Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “Political Participation of Turkey’s Kurds 
and Alevis: A Challenge for Turkey’s Democratic Consolidation,” Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 6, no. 4 (2006): 445–461; Günes Murat Tezcür, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish 
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military’s consistent preeminence in the political sphere, there are differences in opinion. 
These authors generally fall into four camps that argue Turkey’s civil-military relations 
are primarily driven by the strong nature of the state, a militaristic Turkish culture, 
institutions that privilege the armed forces, or ideological alignment amongst civilian and 
military elites.29 
Some scholars have argued that Turkey’s civil-military balance has been defined 
by the strength of unelected state elites vis-à-vis their political counterparts. Metin Heper 
has argued that the state should not be defined in the traditional Weberian sense as 
“human associations that successfully claim monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force.”30 Rather, he considers “stateness” to be a defined by the autonomy of unelected 
elites that “transcend particularist group interests” and do not involve themselves in 
politics.31 Using this definition, Heper has argued that Turkey has maintained a strong 
“state tradition” during its transition to democracy, and that the armed forces, as the 
primary guardians of the state, have reluctantly intervened in politics only when 
absolutely necessary.32 Despite these interventions, Heper argues the military “has 
always had respect for democracy,” and the generals have willingly ceded some of their 
authority in recent years thanks to the belief that civilian oversight is ideal.33 As Ahmet 
Kuru points out, this state-centric approach may describe Turkey’s traditional balance of 
power, but it does not adequately explain the reasons behind the strong state itself.34 
Scholars seeking to better explain the supremacy of the armed forces highlight 
what they describe as Turkey’s militaristic national culture. According to this argument, 
Turks have been raised to view the armed forces as the most important and trustworthy of 
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31 Ibid., 2. 
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state institutions, and therefore are not opposed to it exerting political authority.  Authors 
in this camp, including Gareth Jenkins, point to mandatory conscription as a primary 
factor in tying military service to Turkish identity.35 He points out that the importance of 
this duty is demonstrated by the often-repeated expression, “Every Turk is born a 
soldier.”36 Jenkins argues that national culture, which “sees the military as embodying 
the highest virtues of the nation,” has made it “very difficult psychologically for most 
Turkish politicians to challenge the authority of the military.”37 Ayse Gul Altinay agrees 
that military service serves an important cultural role, but also asserts that the educational 
system—which itself has been heavily shaped by generals—has been essential in creating 
the myth of a Turkish military-nation.38 According to Altinay, the inclusion of weekly 
national security courses in public schools has privileged a “military perspective” toward 
politics that glorifies the armed forces and emphasizes the presence of internal and 
external threats to the Turkish nation.39 A variety of polls demonstrate that Turks 
traditionally had far greater trust in the military than any other state institutions. In a 1999 
survey, 86 percent of respondents answered that they had a “great deal of confidence” or 
“quite a lot of confidence” in the military. The police earned the confidence of 69 
percent, the government 45 percent, the parliament 42 percent, the press 34 percent, and 
political parties only earned confidence from 28 percent of society.40 Zeki Sarigil argues 
that the military’s popularity has created a “favorable environment for the military to 
become involved in civilian politics.”41 As Andrew Mango has written, “the military 
institution remains an important pressure group, whose power derives from the support 
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extended to it by society rather than from legal arrangements. The Turkish military serve 
the state, and their service is appreciated by the public.”42 
The third group of scholars argues that the Turkish military has maintained 
political influence primarily through a set of institutional mechanisms. Ergun Ozbudun 
has outlined the military’s skillful creation of “exit guarantees” to maintain influence 
over civilian politics in the wake of the interventions of 1960, 1971, and 1980.43 By 
pushing through constitutional and legislative changes before returning power to elected 
politicians, the generals incrementally accumulated more political privileges with each 
coup. Most scholars point to the “parallel government” of the National Security Council 
(Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), an advisory board through which the general staff has 
exerted influence on civilian leaders, as the most important of these institutions.44 Umit 
Cizre, one of Turkey’s top scholars on civil-military relations, has argued that in addition 
to exerting influence on civilian governance, the military has also enjoyed a large amount 
of institutional autonomy.45  
Ahmet Kuru has argued that while the above explanations have some merit, the 
military has stayed politically relevant primarily through alliances with civilian elites that 
share its ideological fears. Because many Turks share “assertive secularist, Turkish 
nationalist, and anti-communist” ideologies, the military easily finds support for its 
guardianship status amongst leaders of the judiciary, media, and some political parties.46 
These alliances have allowed the general staff to shape public discourse, informally 
influence politics, and even seize control of the state without provoking a backlash. Tanel 
Demirel has similarly argued that the military’s role in Turkish politics come with the 
consent of much of the society: 
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The Turkish military, which perceives itself as the true guardian of the 
state, enjoys a privileged place in the political system largely because it 
has managed to get the chief actors in polity and citizenry at large to 
consent to such a posture. It has done so not only with the threat of arms 
but also by creating a belief that it has been an indispensable requirement 
for the survival of the Turkish nation.47 
While the variety of explanations of for the historical influence of the Turkish 
Armed Forces are all compelling, thanks to their publication date, many of the above 
works do not capture the dramatic power shift that has occurred in Turkey since 1999 or 
its relationship to the Kurdish question. This research seeks to address this gap in the 
literature. 
3. Islam and Turkish Nationalism 
The historical relationship between Islam and Turkish nationalism has been a 
topic of considerable scholarly debate. In 1904, a Tatar named Yusuf Akcrua published 
an essay declaring that the Ottoman Empire was facing a choice between three competing 
ideologies: an Ottomanism emphasizing equality amongst various national groups, an 
Islamism that attempted to unite the empire (or even the entire Islamic world) based on 
shared religion, and an ethnically-defined Turkism.48 The work heavily influenced early 
Western historians, including Bernard Lewis, who argued that Ottomans of the early 20th 
century finally regained a Turkish identity after the failed projects of Ottomanism and 
Pan-Islamism.49 More recent works by M. Sukru Hanioglu, Kemel Karpat, and Howard 
Eissenstat have argued that such sharp distinctions do not accurately capture the 
ideological pragmatism demonstrated during the transition from imperial to republican 
rule.50 These scholars point out that in the final decades of his rule, Sultan Abdulhamid II 
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instrumentalized religion to strengthen Muslim solidarity in the face of separatism 
amongst Christian millets.51 While the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was 
decidedly anti-clerical and positivist in ideology, it similarly resorted to Islamic rhetoric 
during the second constitutional period in attempt to mobilize Anatolian peasant 
soldiers.52 According to Zurcher, the Young Turks were driven by none of Akcura’s 
three competing ideologies; rather, their policies reveal that they were actually 
nationalists seeking to establish a state for Muslim Ottomans.53 Eissenstat argues that the 
process of conflating “Muslimness” and the ethnic Turkish identity occurred over the 
decades preceding the revolution.54 After founding the republic, Ataturk committed to 
programs of modernization and secularization, forcing the state’s abandonment of a 
national identity based on religion in favor of one defined by shared language and 
culture.55  
A variety of scholars have argued that ambiguous concepts of Kemalism, national 
identity, and the place for religion continue to have important ramifications on the role of 
Turkey’s contemporary political dynamics. Zurcher highlights that, contrary to the anti-
Islam character often ascribed to the secular state, Ankara has continued to 
instrumentalize religion when it sees fit, as when Kenan Evran mandated nationwide 
religious education supporting the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” following the 1980 
coup.56 According to Haldun Gulalp, Turkey’s unique form of secularism, which 
simultaneously bans religion from the political sphere but also assumes control of its 
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institutions, is inherently undemocratic.57 M. Hakan Yavuz argues that there exists a 
large disparity between the hegemonic ideology of secular Kemalism and the religious 
beliefs of most Turks.58 The resulting tension, combined with “opportunity spaces” 
created by the liberalizing policies of Turgut Ozal, allowed for the growth of a growing 
Muslim bourgeoisie business class and Naksibendi religious movements.59 Yavuz argues 
that the religious civil-society groups, the most prominent of which is the Nurcu 
movement led by Fetullah Gulen, have promoted pluralism and moderation by offering 
religious alternative to the state-sanctioned variant.60 Anthropologist Jenny White argues 
that the Naksibendi movements, who engage in unofficial “vernacular politics” based on 
shared values and community networks, have been a central component of a growing 
“Muslim nationalist” class of Turks that assert that Islam is compatible with democracy 
and modernity. Both Yavuz and White highlight that that members of these movements 
have increasingly referenced Turkey’s Muslim character while advocating an inclusive, 
neo-Ottoman concept of citizenship divorced of ethnicity.61 Waxman characterizes the 
changes in Turkish identity as a two-way “perpetual negotiation” that has begun with the 
founding of the republic: the Islamization of an artificial, state-created Turkish 
nationalism along with the molding of a Turkish form of Islam that respects the limits 
imposed on it by the state.62 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a historical study focusing on important recent political events and 
the public discourse surrounding Kurdish nationalist violence in Turkey. Due to language 
restrictions, the bulk of the research utilizes secondary sources in English, including 
scholarly volumes and peer-review journal articles. Whenever possible, secondary 
sources based on direct interviews receive priority attention. Thanks to their growing 
availability in English, Turkish newspapers serve as primary sources, especially on recent 
political events. Because the two most accessible publications—Hurriyet Daily News and 
Today’s Zaman—are viewed as having sharply opposed political leanings, this thesis 
attempts to balance their contributions.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In exploring the changes in Turkish society that have improved the chance for 
political settlement, this thesis will proceed by examining each hypothesis in greater 
detail. Chapter II will argue that the Kurdish national movement’s expanding avenues of 
political participation have increased opportunities for political settlement. The chapter 
will begin by outlining the history of Kurdish nationalism during the republican era, 
paying extra attention to the factors behind the PKK’s uncontested leadership within the 
movement. It will then proceed by attempting to evaluate whether other pro-Kurdish 
political actors might be considered a “moderate alternative” to Ocalan’s organization. 
Chapter III argues that a dramatic shift in Turkey’s civil-military relations has 
removed long-standing restrictions on political measures aimed at resolving the conflict. 
It will begin by demonstrating that Turkey’s military has long acted as one of the state’s 
most important political actors, as evidenced by its history of interventions and its 
institutional means of exerting influence over civilian politicians. The chapter will argue 
that the military maintained control over the state’s response to Kurdish terrorism for 
much of the conflict, and that the generals viewed the problem entirely as a security issue 
that could be won through force. While the resulting heavy-handed strategies may have 
succeeded in crippling the PKK’s military capabilities, they also mobilized the Kurdish 
population into supporting the nationalist movement. The chapter will argue that while 
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the EU accession process triggered democratic reforms that decreased the military’s 
formal means of exerting influence, its political stature was weakened by showdowns 
with the ruling AKP. The chapter will conclude by illustrating that after the military’s 
influence was undercut, Prime Minister Erdogan was finally free to propose policies that 
indicated an increasing openness toward political solutions.      
Chapter IV asserts that an increasing importance of Ottoman-Islamic identity has 
helped discredit exclusive concepts of Turkish nationalism, and that these changes have 
brought Turkey closer to a more-inclusive model of citizenship. The chapter will begin 
by reviewing the increasing prominence of Islamic identity and Ottoman narratives in 
Turkish political discourse since the founding of the republic. In effort to examine the 
effects of this resurgence on the resolution of Kurdish question, the discussion will then 
turn to a detailed analysis of the applicable discourse of Turkey’s most influential Islamic 
political actors: the AKP and the Gulen movement. 
Chapter V will conclude the thesis by briefly discussing the current peace 
negotiations between the AKP and Abdullah Ocalan and evaluating whether the process 
might finally lead to a lasting peace agreement. 
  
 18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 19 
II. THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s struggle against militant Kurdish nationalism is not new. Shortly after 
the formation of the republic, a series of insurrections demonstrated the desire of many 
Kurds to restore the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Ottoman Empire. In response, 
Ankara denied the existence of a unique Kurdish identity and attempted to assimilate all 
citizens into the Turkish nation. Thanks to the state’s high willingness to repress 
dissenters, Kurdish nationalism was largely dormant until the 1960s, when it began 
finding a voice amongst the Turkish left. In 1978, Abdullah Ocalan formed the PKK as a 
Marxist-Leninist group committed to using guerilla warfare and terrorism to achieve 
independence for Kurds in Turkey’s southeast. The PKK launched its insurgency against 
state security forces in 1984 and came to dominate the Kurdish nationalist movement 
thanks to Ocalan’s charismatic leadership and brutal willingness to kill all dissenters. 
After Ocalan was captured in 1999, many predicted that Kurdish nationalism had run its 
course in Turkey. Nonetheless, Ocalan was able to maintain control of the organization 
from prison, and the PKK resumed terror attacks in 2004.  
In March 2013, Ocalan declared a ceasefire as part of a new round of direct 
negotiations between him and the state. Many are hopeful that these new talks may 
finally bring to an end the bloody conflict that has claimed nearly 40,000 lives. 
Nonetheless, Ocalan is a highly polarizing negotiating partner from the perspective of the 
Turkish public. His primary objective—getting released from prison—is absolutely 
unthinkable for the average Turk. If that issue cannot be resolved, the process may fall 
apart and open the door to a fresh round of violence. I assert that in the long term, the 
chances of achieving a lasting peace will be tied to finding a “moderate alternative”63 to 
the PKK: a political actor who is willing to condemn political violence and compromise 
on contentious political issues. In looking at the history of Kurdish nationalism in 
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Turkey, research focuses on answering some critical questions. Does the pro-Kurdish 
movement include moderate political and civil actors? What restrictions have impeded 
the growth of moderates? Have recent changes in Turkey’s political landscape helped or 
hurt these actors’ chances of becoming legitimate representatives of the movement? I 
argue that the pro-Kurdish political movement parties, today represented by the Peace 
and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), did not develop into 
independent, moderate actors thanks to coercion from the state and pressure to align with 
the PKK. Nonetheless, the state’s relaxed restrictions on associations and political speech 
have dramatically increased opportunities for non-violent Kurdish activists to form 
associations, articulate their demands, and engage leaders. Although activists currently 
may not be able to challenge Ocalan as a representative of the movement, the 
strengthening of civil society has improved the chances that moderate pro-Kurdish actors 
will soon help resolve the conflict peacefully. 
This chapter will proceed by first outlining the history of Kurdish nationalism in 
Turkey, paying particular attention to the factors that have contributed to the PKK’s 
dominance of the movement. It will then survey some of the movement’s other political 
and civil actors, focusing on their credentials as potential moderate alternatives to the 
militant wing of the movement.  
B. KURDISH NATIONALISM IN TURKEY  
1. Prior to 1984 
During most of the Ottoman Empire, the state primarily distinguished its subjects 
based on religion, with Muslims retaining a privileged stature above that of the non-
Muslim dhimmi minorities. Nonetheless, most non-Muslim minority communities, or 
millets, enjoyed a relative degree of local autonomy in matters of governance, language, 
and customs.64 In 1804, nationalism first began to weaken the empire when a Russian-
aided insurrection in Serbia catalyzed a resistance movement that eventually brought the 
region independence.65 In an effort to prevent further regional challenges to Ottoman 
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power, Sultan Mahmud II undercut the power of the provincial leaders (ayans) 
throughout the empire in the 1820s and 1830s.66 Imperial advisors feared that nationalist 
sentiment, especially if combined with incitement from external powers, could lead to 
further loss of territory.67 Incorporating these concerns, the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 
declared all subjects to be Ottomans that would receive equal protection under imperial 
law, regardless of religion.68 Despite this attempt to placate Christian minorities and rival 
European powers, separatism and foreign wars would continue to plague the empire 
throughout its final decades. 
In the predominantly Kurdish regions of southeast Anatolia, Mahmud’s repression 
of local ayans, combined with historic tribal divisions, largely limited nationalist 
sentiment until the end of the nineteenth century.69 After the secular chieftains had been 
deposed, a large power vacuum opened that religious Kurdish sheikhs eventually filled.70 
Several scholars agree that the first significant Kurdish nationalist leader was Sheikh 
Ubayd Allah, who Abdulhamid appointed to head regional forces in the defense of the 
northeastern empire during the Russo-Turk War of 1877–1878.71 Under the ensuing 
Treaty of Berlin, Kurds were alarmed that Armenian minorities were guaranteed a 
protected status, which they worried may lead to that group earning its independence. 
Partly in response to this threat, Ubayd Allah led an invasion of Persia in 1880 with the 
intent of establishing an independent Kurdish state.72 Although the invasion was 
unsuccessful, it marked the first of many rebellions intended to forge Kurdish 
independence.  
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In the first years of the 20th century, Kurdish nationalists were largely divided 
into two groups. In the first group were those that desired Kurdish autonomy within a 
traditional Ottoman framework; some of these reformers would help form the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP), which seized control of the state in the 1908 constitutional 
revolution. The second group, which sought complete independence for Kurdistan, 
included Kurdish intellectuals, who formed nationalist organizations in urban centers, and 
sheikhs concerned about the loss of the caliphate and their favored status under 
Abdulhamid.73 When World War I broke out, Kurdish nationalist aspirations were largely 
set aside, as Kurdish leaders were still concerned about encroachment by Armenians and 
Russians. Kurds thus joined Ottoman soldiers in the fight against their shared enemies, at 
times participating in ruthless massacres of Armenian civilians. After the armistice was 
declared in 1918, most Kurds put their support behind Mustafa Kemal’s national 
resistance movement, which sought to restore the empire’s sovereignty over Anatolia. In 
outlining the movement’s objectives, Kemal emphasized Islamic solidarity against the 
encroaching foreign threat in effort to maintain Kurdish support.74 When the Treaty of 
Sevres was finally signed in 1920, its mandate for Kurdish autonomy gave Kurds a huge 
opportunity to pursue independence. Despite this, Kurdish leaders—with the exception of 
those who led the failed Kocgiri uprising in Dersim—remained largely loyal to Kemal 
throughout the War of Independence.75  
After the nationalists’ victory and the creation of the Turkish Republic, the 
relationship between the state and its Kurdish population deteriorated rapidly. In 1923, 
the new government began eliminating all references to Kurdistan and changing place 
names from Kurdish to Turkish. The following year, Ankara mandated Turkish as the 
sole language of courts and schools, effectively obstructing education for most Kurdish 
children. Perhaps the most egregious offenses in the minds of many Kurds, however, 
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were Kemal’s abolition of the caliphate and banning of all religion in public life.76 The 
government’s desire to suppress the language and religious institutions of the Kurds 
elicited a strong surge in nationalism as evidenced by the formation of the Azadi 
(Freedom) movement in Erzurum.77 From this group emerged Sheikh Said of Palu, who 
started a major revolt against local Turkish gendarmes in February 1925. To suppress the 
rebellion, Ankara deployed almost half its army to the region and enacted draconian 
“Tribunals of Independence” to punish offenders.78 Although the Turkish government 
sought to paint the insurgents as religious reactionaries, scholars have largely agreed that 
the insurrection had both nationalist and religious causes.79 The Sheikh Said rebellion 
was emblematic of the increasingly significant problem of Kurdish nationalism in the 
new republic; of eighteen revolts against the state between 1924 and 1938, seventeen 
were Kurdish in origin.80 
Although the brutal repression of the 1938 Dersim rebellion kept separatist 
expressions to a minimum for over two decades, the 1960s saw an upswing in Kurdish 
nationalism that David McDowall deemed a “revival.”81 Commonly cited explanations 
for the timing of the increase include demographic factors such as higher urbanization 
and unemployment.82 Some scholars have also pointed to Mustafa Barzani’s return to 
prominence following the 1958 Iraqi revolution as a galvanizer of Kurdish identity.83 
Nicole Watts and Omer Taspinar emphasize changes brought about as part of Turkey’s 
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1960 coup, including relaxed national restrictions on trade associations and the media.84 
Watts also highlights that the introduction of a proportional electoral system for 
parliament allowed smaller political parties to successfully run their candidates.85 Thanks 
to the combination of these factors, Kurdish activists had greater desire and opportunities 
to challenge existing government policies through established political processes. 
For much of the 1960s, pro-Kurdish challengers sought their political objectives 
through non-violent left wing parties and associations. The most prominent of these was 
the socialist Turkish Workers’ Party (Turkiye Isci Partisi, TIP), which Watts argues gave 
Kurdish activists access to resources, networks, and ideas that strengthened and shaped 
their political discourse.86 Although TIP was an invaluable platform for pro-Kurdish 
intellectuals, the organization largely avoided addressing ethnicity-based grievances 
directly, but instead focused on broad concepts of democratic and economic equality.87 
Because many party representatives could not directly address Kurdish grievances, they 
instead championed “Eastism,” a set of policies intended to improve the backwardness of 
the southeastern region.88 
In the 1970s, many Kurdish activists sought to more directly challenge the state 
on its oppression of their rights. Because the mainstream Turkish socialist organizations 
were unwilling to adopt such a cause, the activists formed new groups that retained leftist 
ideologies but focused solely on Kurdish grievances.89 At a 1975 meeting in Ankara, 
Abdullah Ocalan and fifteen others decided to form a new organization dedicated to 
fighting for an independent Kurdish state shaped by Marxist-Leninist ideology.90 
Although there were many Kurdish nationalist groups at the time, the relatively unknown 
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Ocalan attracted members by advocating for an immediate armed struggle.91 He soon 
moved the organization, which took the name Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978, 
to the Kurdish regions of southeastern Turkey. The group initially used violence 
exclusively against rival Kurdish actors—wealthy landowners and other leftist groups—
in order to assert its power in the region.92 In the year preceding the 1980 military coup, 
Ocalan traveled to Syria and Lebanon and avoided the military administration’s wave of 
arrests that imprisoned many prominent political dissidents. In August 1984, after having 
taken up bases in northern Iraq and the mountains of southeastern Turkey, the PKK 
launched its first wave of attacks on Turkish security forces, marking the beginning of its 
long insurgency. In addition to attacks on the military, the PKK also organized riots, 
orchestrated boycotts, and distributed propaganda intended to turn the Kurdish population 
against the Turkish state.93 
2. 1984 to 1999 
It was not long before Ankara initiated sweeping efforts to counter the PKK’s 
violent campaign in the Southeast. Although the military administration had restored 
democratic rule in 1983, it nonetheless maintained significant control over Turkey’s 
defense policies.94 Thus, while newly elected Prime Minister Turgut Ozal made 
unprecedented pronouncements recognizing the Kurdish identity, militant nationalism 
was dealt with primarily as security problem. Martial law, which had been declared 
throughout the region in 1980 as part of the coup, was replaced in 1987 by the 
Emergency Rule Law (OHAL), which granted an unelected governor extremely broad 
counterterror powers that included detention without trial and forced evacuation of entire 
villages.95 Some observers have estimated that over two million Kurds lost their homes 
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throughout the 1990s during forced relocations under OHAL rule.96 Ankara also 
established the controversial Village Guard system in 1985, in which security forces 
armed, trained, and paid civilian Kurds to protect their localities from the PKK. Some 
critics have alleged the program, which still exists today, increased violence in the region 
by encouraging waves of retaliatory attacks between local tribes and the PKK.97 
Although Ankara’s policies were reasonably effective at checking the PKK’s military 
capabilities, they nonetheless increased discontent amongst many Kurdish citizens. 
By the end of the 1980s, the PKK had assumed the role of the uncontested leader 
of the Kurdish national movement. This can partly be explained by rising Kurdish 
sentiment that only the PKK was willing to stand up for Kurdish rights against an 
increasingly heavy-handed Turkish state. Although some of the PKK’s tactics were 
unpopular—the killing of civilians and mandatory conscription, for example—they were 
increasingly viewed as justified, especially given local traditions that permitted 
communal revenge.98 The PKK also benefitted from a lack of competition from other 
Kurdish nationalist actors. This paucity of challengers was likely the result of the post-
coup wave of arrests, in which thousands of leftist and Kurdish actors were imprisoned, 
and the PKK’s reputation of violently dispatching with political rivals.99 Increasing 
urbanization may have also increased Kurdish acceptance of the PKK, whose secular 
Marxist-Leninist ideology stood in stark contrast to the Islamic values and tribal identities 
associated with the citizens of the rural Southeast. As villagers arrived in the cities such 
as Diyarbakir looking for work, those feeling newly detached from their traditions may 
have been receptive to Ocalan’s offer of a “new Kurdish identity.”100 The PKK also 
gained support through the efforts of political organizations it created. In 1985, Ocalan 
ordered the formation of the Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Eniya Rizgariya 
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Netewa Kurdistan, ERNK), an organization largely focused on mobilizing popular 
support for the movement in Europe. The ERNK organized a variety of events, including 
rallies, hunger strikes, and music festivals centered on fostering a revival of Kurdish 
culture.101 The ERNK existed as a division of the larger Kurdish Parliament in Exile, 
later known as the Kurdistan National Congress (Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan, KNK).102 
The KNK was formed to portray the Kurdish national movement, including members 
from Syria, Iran, and Iraq, as legitimate in the eyes of the international community.103 
Regardless of their democratic appearances, many observers agree PKK leaders maintain 
control or influence on most of these organizations.104  
The PKK showed noticeable shifts in ideology during the 1990s. Most critically, 
Ocalan began backing down from his organization’s raison d'être: an independent 
Kurdish state. In 1990, he stated, “There is no question of separating from Turkey. My 
people need Turkey. We can’t split for at least 40 years.”105 Since then, Ocalan and PKK 
spokesmen have argued that a solution might be reached within the existing borders of 
Turkey if Ankara is willing to grant autonomy and increased cultural rights.106 With the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the PKK also recognized that the other pillar of its founding 
charter—Marxist-Leninism—had lost much of its credibility. Similarly, the resurgence of 
Islamic identity throughout Turkish society highlighted the dissonance between the 
organization’s secular ideology and the values of average citizens. In the 1990s, Ocalan 
thus removed the hammer and sickle from the PKK’s flag, formed splinter groups 
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justifying liberation through Islamic narratives, and delivered speeches praising 
Muhammad as a “great revolutionary.”107 
Turkey’s Kurdish national movement marked an important milestone in 1990, 
when the People’s Labor Party (Halkin Emek Partisi, HEP) formed. The HEP was the 
republic’s first legal pro-Kurdish party, although the state election law prohibited it from 
explicitly referencing ethnic identity. While Ocalan initially considered the HEP a threat 
to the PKK, he soon came to view the new party as useful to advancement of the national 
movement. Although the party was closed in 1993 for ties to the PKK, its members all 
immediately formed the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP) to take its place. 
This marked the first of what would become a string of Kurdish party closures as the 
movement attempted to maintain a political presence in the face of Ankara’s opposition. 
The most dramatic instance of such conflict occurred in 1994, when the state revoked 
seven DEP deputies’ parliamentary immunity, charged them with crimes related to 
supporting the PKK, and banned the party outright.108 
During the 1990s, violence tied to the PKK’s insurgency reached record shocking 
levels. The Turkish armed forces, having adopted new weapons and tactics, largely 
routed the PKK militarily in 1994 and 1995, but the organization continued its resistance 
through terror attacks throughout the country, including some instances of suicide 
bombings.109 The conflict took a dramatic turn in 1999, when the state achieved a 
stunning victory by capturing Ocalan on the run in Kenya. He was soon tried and 
sentenced to death, although Ankara later reduced this to a life sentence to help Turkey 
comply with EU norms. After Ocalan’s capture, he continued to exert influence over the 
operations of the PKK from his cell in the Imrali Island prison. This was demonstrated 
shortly after his capture, when Ocalan ordered a ceasefire and PKK militants immediately 
complied. After the PKK forces retreated across the Iraqi border, many believed the 
bloody 15-year insurgency was finally over. 
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3. 1999 to the Present 
In the few years following Ocalan’s capture, it appeared that Turkey had finally 
overcome the problem of militant Kurdish nationalism. Having sustained a significant 
military defeat, the PKK announced its dedication to democratization through non-
violence and changed its name twice.110 The Turkish government also signaled a new 
approach to Kurdish grievances. Legislative packages passed to align Turkey with EU 
standards ended the ban on Kurdish in broadcasting and private education.111 In 2002, 
Ankara restored normal governance to the three regions of the southeast still under 
emergency rule. That same year, the AKP entered office, raising Kurds’ hopes for 
gaining further cultural rights. The party, which ran a large number of ethnic Kurds as 
candidates, emphasized democracy as a potential solution for militant nationalism. With 
political violence nearly non-existent, cities such as Diyarbakir witnessed dramatic 
increases in political participation and civil society associations.112  
In June 2004, the PKK ended its five-year ceasefire with an attack on Turkish 
security forces, arguing that Ankara was unfairly holding Ocalan in solitary confinement 
and avoiding dialogue on improving Kurdish rights.113 One year later, Prime Minister 
Erdogan referred to the “Kurdish problem” for the first time and promised to solve the 
issue through democracy. His conciliatory tone disappeared soon, however, when terror 
attacks spread to cities throughout western Turkey. A previously unknown organization, 
the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK), claimed 
responsibility for some of the bombings, leading analysts to wonder if it was a legitimate 
splinter group or a fictional entity invented to distance the PKK from civilian deaths. The 
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increased violence provoked a backlash of Turkish nationalism that compelled the AKP 
to further delay its promised democratic reforms, including a new constitution. 
In 2005, Ocalan ordered the creation of the of Kurdistan Communities Union 
(Koma Civakan Kurdistan, KCK), an umbrella organization that unites the PKK and 
related Kurdish nationalist organizations from around the region. The KCK’s primary 
purpose, however, is the establishment of a parallel government apparatus made up of 
PKK members that influence the legal activities of local politicians, businesses, and civil 
associations.114 It effectively created a new means for Ocalan to exert influence on civil 
actors and members of the latest of the Kurdish movement parties, the Democratic 
Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). In 2007, DTP marked a milestone by 
winning 21 seats in parliament, the first held by pro-Kurdish MPs in thirteen years. Most 
surprising, however, was the AKP’s electoral success in the Southeast, where it defeated 
the DTP in many provinces. Many Kurds were apparently still hopeful that Erdogan 
would deliver on his promise to improve Kurdish rights. By 2009, however, Kurdish 
support for the AKP had declined despite the January launch of TRT Six, a state-run 
channel broadcasting entirely in Kurdish. Later that year, the DTP made significant gains 
in local elections at the expense of the ruling party. Not long after the elections, AKP 
leaders promised a renewed attempt to resolve the Kurdish question through democratic 
reform. The “Kurdish Opening,” seemed threatened, however, after public anger at 
images of PKK fighters triumphantly celebrating their return from Iraq.115 In December 
2009, hopes of reconciliation were again shattered when the Constitutional Court banned 
the DTP and Turkish police arrested hundreds, including thirty-five DTP mayors, on 
charges that they were members of the KCK.116 Pro-Kurdish politicians that survived the 
sweep switched into the newly formed Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve Demokrasi 
Partisi, BDP), which remains as the movement party today. 
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Two years later, the AKP made a stunning admission: the National Intelligence 
Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) secretly had been conducting direct talks 
with PKK leaders in Oslo since 2009.117 Although the AKP had long decried 
negotiations with terrorists as sacrilege, public reaction to the news was largely muted. 
Perhaps as a result of the talks, the PKK called a ceasefire in the fall, but it would be 
short lived. In the months preceding the 2011 parliamentary elections, both sides took 
aggressive measures. In June, after the state election board canceled newly elected Hatin 
Dicle’s parliamentary membership, the BDP began a three-month boycott of the 
assembly. The Oslo talks ended abruptly, Ankara cut off Ocalan’s access to his lawyers, 
and violence escalated to levels that had not been seen since the early 1990s.118 In 
December, the public was shocked to learn that Turkish fighter jets had killed 34 civilian 
smugglers near Uludere, having apparently mistaken them for PKK fighters.119  
In September 2012, a small group of Kurdish prisoners began a hunger strike. 
Their demands were twofold: end Ocalan’s isolation and remove restrictions on the use 
of Kurdish in education and government services. Soon, several hundred others had 
joined in the strike, including several prominent BDP deputies. After 68 days, Ocalan 
ordered the strike to end, and the protestors immediately complied.120 Just over a month 
later, Erdogan announced that the AKP and Ocalan were working on a new, three-phase 
plan to end the conflict. On January 3, two BDP MPs visited Ocalan on the Imrali island 
prison for the first of a series of talks. On March 21st, the Kurdish holiday of Newroz, 
Ocalan announced phase one of the plan: he ordered the PKK to withdraw from Turkey. 
In the months since, it has come to light that the second phase of the plan will consist of 
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legislative reforms and the adoption of a new constitution in order to address some of the 
Kurdish movement’s political grievances. The final phase would see the PKK finally lay 
down their arms for good and return to Turkey.121  
Although many Turks are hopeful that the Imrali talks will finally bring an end to 
the bloody conflict, some are skeptical of the actors’ sincerity. Observers have alleged 
that Erdogan, who is approaching the end of his final term as prime minister, is primarily 
motivated by a desire to pass a constitution that will give Turkey a presidential system 
and, with it, a chance for him to remain leader of the government.122 In order to pass such 
a system—which is not supported by either the of the major opposition parties—Erdogan 
needs an alliance with the BDP. It appears the prime minister may only get the pro-
Kurdish party’s support if he agrees to Ocalan’s demands. According to the BDP, these 
demands are the release of Ocalan and all KCK suspects; the ceasing of building new 
gendarmerie posts and dams in the Southeast; education in Kurdish; the abolition of the 
anti-terrorism law; the end of the Village Guard system; and the lowering of the ten 
percent election threshold required to seat candidates in parliament.123 While many in 
Turkey may be willing to accept some of these concessions, releasing Ocalan—even to 
house arrest—would likely provoke an extreme backlash amongst Turks. Because 
Erdogan and the AKP are proceeding unilaterally, opposition party members and the 
public are still feeling left in the dark.124 Although the Imrali talks have provided a 
glimmer of hope, the current process faces many challenges that could easily derail it. 
While the primary negotiators have strong personal incentives to reach a deal—Ocalan 
getting released and Erdogan becoming president—it is my contention that a lasting 
peace is unlikely until the moderates on both sides of the conflict can bridge ideological 
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gaps between them. The remainder of this chapter will examine whether recent increases 
in political opportunities for Kurdish nationalists have helped shape “moderate 
alternatives” to the PKK. 
C. PRO-KURDISH ACTIVISTS: THE SEARCH FOR THE MODERATE 
ALTERNATIVE 
In analyzing the chances for resolving the Kurdish conflict, I will frame the 
problem as one of incomplete democratic consolidation. In his analysis of the situation, 
Murat Somer follows Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan by arguing that conflict resolution is 
most likely when cooperation can be encouraged between the moderates on either side of 
the conflict.125 Somer asserts that Kurdish political actors must demonstrate moderation 
in two dimensions. First, they must credibly denounce violence and act autonomously 
from the PKK. Second, they must have the ideological flexibility to bridge the “cognitive 
gaps” between themselves and Turkish moderates.126 In other words, they must 
demonstrate the willingness to meet their moderate counterparts halfway. Using Somer’s 
criteria, I will examine the moderate credentials of the three most prominent pro-Kurdish 
parties and some notable civil actors.  
1. Political Parties 
The pro-Kurdish movement political parties, from the HEP to the BDP, have 
played an important role in the assertion of national identity. When Kurdish activists 
enter the established political system, they gain important resources, including legal 
immunity, a national audience, and access to high-level politicians both in Turkey and 
abroad.127 Using these resources, Kurdish politicians have generally employed three 
methods of furthering their nationalist agenda. First, they have used their prominent 
positions as “loudspeaker systems” to directly contest state policies and challenge 
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traditional narratives. Second, they have created parallel government structures to help 
foster a sense of Kurdish collective consciousness. Third, they have attempted to reshape 
state policies directly through political actions within state institutions.128 
Despite their access to political resources, the movement parties have not charted 
an independent course or challenged the PKK for leadership of the Kurdish national 
movement for two reasons. First, Ankara has repeatedly marginalized the parties based 
on their association with the PKK or articulations of Kurdish nationalist ideologies. Since 
1990, Ankara has closed nearly every pro-Kurdish party and imprisoned hundreds of 
politicians for their statements or connections to the PKK.129 Because they face such a 
hostile political system, few pro-Kurdish politicians have dared enter the fray. For those 
that have entered politics, it has been critical to temper their messages to avoid criminal 
charges or worse. Second, pro-Kurdish actors feel significant pressure to remain aligned 
with the PKK. This is partly thanks to the PKK’s long history of attacking or threatening 
its political challengers. Resit Deli, a deputy of the smaller Rights and Freedom Party 
(HAK-PAR), stated, “Most Kurds are fed up with Abdullah Ocalan and the PKK, but 
they cannot say so openly because they are intimidated."130 Some of the pressure on the 
parties to stay aligned with the PKK, however, comes from their constituents. Amongst 
those Kurds that vote along ethnic lines, support amongst the PKK is extremely high; 
publically criticizing Ocalan or his organization might thus be viewed as a betrayal of the 
movement. Watts has argued that because few BDP party members are former PKK 
fighters, they lack the “battlefield” credentials of Ocalan, and thus rely on his 
endorsement to shore up votes.131  
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a. Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) 
The BDP, like the pro-Kurdish parties before it, has consistently avoided 
operating autonomously from the PKK. As discussed earlier, this lack of independence is 
driven by the political realities of representing the Kurdish nationalist movement. For this 
reason, the party has rarely denounced violence perpetrated in the name of Kurdish 
nationalism. After seven civilians were killed in two attacks on the same day in 
September 2011, BDP co-chairs Selahattin Demirtas and Gultan Kisanak condemned the 
attacks but avoided naming the PKK.132 In October 2012, BDP deputies denounced 
attacks on schools in southeastern Turkey by alleged PKK supporters, going as far as to 
call the attacks “terrorist activity,” and stating that the party “could not approve of them 
on any account.”133 In response to their criticism, the PKK labeled the MPs as traitors.134 
Similarly, party leaders have occasionally called for the PKK to lay down 
its arms and pursue negotiations. In October 2011, after a particularly bloody battle 
between PKK fighters and the army in Hakkari, the party leaders issued a written 
statement calling for an end to fighting: “We appeal to both the PKK and government to 
immediately end the war . . . Dialogue is the only solution.”135 Diyarbakir BDP mayor 
Osman Baydemir, who is considered by some to be far less beholden to Ocalan than other 
party politicians, has spoken out against violence as well: “Neither side should use 
violence, otherwise neither the PKK nor the government will reach their goal . . . We 
have to look for an all-encompassing solution.”136 Nonetheless, the BDP’s denunciations 
of PKK violence are mostly notable for their rarity; there are countless attacks that pass 
without comment. 
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The BDP’s unwillingness to consistently condemn violence furthers the 
perception that the organization is merely the political wing of the PKK. Such views are 
widely held even amongst Kurdish activists. Zeynel Abidin Kizilyaprak, an advocate of 
Kurdish rights, stated:  
The BDP didn’t win those elections. It’s the PKK. There is no such 
organization as the BDP, and the BDP knows that best of all. There is one 
PKK representative who chooses all the candidates. If you join the party, 
there’s one condition: you have to become the PKK’s parrot. You have to 
pay back your debt.137  
Ali Kemal Ozcan, a Kurdish academic who has spent time with Ocalan 
and the PKK, argues that the BDP is not a moderate interlocutor, but rather a military 
organization: “The BDP is like the PKK leg working in the field. It does not have any 
authority to make a decision . . . Which one of the BDP deputies can criticize any of 
Ocalan’s remarks?”138 The sentiment that the BDP and PKK are synonymous, also 
widely held amongst Turkish citizens, was further inflamed by the circulation of a video 
in August 2012. The video showed a group of prominent BDP MPs, including Aysel 
Tuğluk and Gultan Kisanak, warmly greeting and hugging armed PKK militants on a 
remote road in the Southeast.139 A few months later, another video emerged in which 
BDP deputy Ozdal Ucer advised citizens to take up weapons against security forces at the 
funeral of a PKK fighter.140 Public outcry over the events led Prime Minister Erdogan to 
threaten to revoke the MPs’ parliamentary immunity, although the motion never reached 
the floor of the assembly.141 Events such as these underscore the beliefs of many Turks 
that the BDP has neither the desire nor the ability to act independently of the PKK. 
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While the BDP has not consistently denounced PKK violence, it has at 
times demonstrated the ideological flexibility to facilitate moderate-moderate 
cooperation. However, there are aspects of its recent discourse that have caused 
confusion or provoked a backlash from Turkish nationalists. One of the more contentious 
of the party’s recent demands is that of “democratic autonomy.” Although this is now a 
core tenet of the BDP’s rhetoric, the party has been inconsistent on what democratic 
autonomy entails. In recent years, the party has advocated a new state structure that is 
federal in nature: between 15 to 26 regional governments with their own flags, locally 
elected governors, legislatures, and taxation systems.142 According to a 2011 poll, 
however, such a proposal is extremely unpopular in Turkey: only seven percent of all 
citizens support a federation, and the number drops to three percent amongst ethnic 
Turks.143 Nonetheless, it is possible that BDP may have some ideological flexibility on 
the matter. In 2010, the party drafted a proposal for democratic autonomy that described 
it merely as the strengthening of regional governance under the existing structure.144 
Because such a proposal is far more popular—28 percent of citizens would support it—
there may be room for negotiating on this core demand of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement. 
When it comes to matters related to identity, the BDP has argued that a 
new constitution must not discriminate against Kurds in any way. The party seeks the 
removal of any terminology that references Turkishness, which they argue marginalizes 
other ethnicities. The BDP’s draft constitution replaces the terms “Turkish nation” with 
“the people of Turkey,” although BDP MP Ahmet Turk has claimed that the party would 
not object if the change were not adopted.145 The current constitution, when referring to 
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the republic, reads, “its language is Turkish,” while the BDP’s draft states, “the state’s 
official language is Turkish.”146 Polling has shown that such changes would be supported 
by approximately a third of the population, indicating that cooperation between 
moderates may be indeed possible on these issues.147 Of note, the BDP has not explicitly 
called for the addition of Kurdish as an additional official language, a move that would 
undoubtedly spark a backlash amongst Turks. 
Another important demand of the BDP is the possibility of education in 
mother tongues other than Turkish. While education in Kurdish is currently permitted at 
the university level and private schools, it is only available in public schools as an 
elective.148 BDP leaders have argued that public school students should be able to receive 
their education entirely in Kurdish where there is demand. Further, they argue that the 
state should attempt to provide public services in mother tongue languages to those who 
do not speak Turkish. Again, the public is not strongly opposed to such proposals: a 2012 
poll showed that 61 percent of citizens support mother-tongue education if students also 
learn Turkish.149 Similarly, another survey showed that 53 percent of the public agrees 
with the statement “convenience should be provided for those receiving public service in 
mother tongues other than Turkish.”150 In the area of granting increased recognition of 
Kurdish identity, the BDP has articulated a set of proposals that are moderate enough to 
serve as a baseline for negotiations. 
Perhaps the most contentious issue in the resolution of the Kurdish 
conflict is the future of PKK and KCK members. Soon after the 2013 Imrali talks began, 
the BDP released a list of demands that would need to be met prior to the PKK 
disarming. While the list included many of the demands discussed above, it most strongly 
emphasized something considered unthinkable for a majority of Turks: the release of 
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Abdullah Ocalan.151 The statement also called for the release of all those imprisoned 
under the sweeping KCK investigations, which some argue is as many as eight thousand 
people.152 Amnesty is an extremely unpopular idea amongst the country’s ethnic Turks: 
less than three percent favor amnesty for PKK fighters overall, and less than two percent 
believe Ankara should transfer Ocalan to house arrest. Even amongst ethnic Kurds, only 
17 percent support house arrest.153  Thus, even most moderate Turks will find this to be a 
considerable roadblock to future negotiations. Some have argued that the inclusion of 
such demands is not only unrealistic, but it overshadows the remainder of the BDP’s 
reform proposals, which are far more moderate. Their parroting of Ocalan’s demands 
underlines that the BDP—and the rest of the PKK/KCK leadership, for that matter—is 
still completely beholden to their imprisoned leader.154 Some have alleged that the BDP 
is not happy about their diminished role in the talks, and may have leaked minutes from 
the sessions to embarrass Ocalan and sabotage the negotiations.155 Until the BDP can 
more decisively break their links with Ocalan, however, it will continue to be viewed as a 
radical organization in the eyes of the Turkish majority, regardless of its espoused 
ideology.  
b. Smaller Pro-Kurdish Parties 
The BDP is not the only political party representing the promotion of 
Kurdish identity. The Participatory Democracy Party (Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi, 
KADEP) has attempted to differentiate itself amongst pro-Kurdish actors by condemning 
violence on either side of the conflict. The party was founded by the late Serafettin Elci, 
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who had made history in 1979 when, while serving as a cabinet minister, he declared, 
“There are Kurds in Turkey. I am also Kurdish.”156 Elci first formed another party—the 
Democratic Mass Party (Demokratik Kitle Partisi, DKP)—in 1996 as an attempt to avoid 
the “mistakes” of the dominant pro-Kurdish movement parties and pursue “a more 
cautious approach.”157 Elci was an early advocate of a federal structure as a solution to 
the Kurdish question, and hoped that his party could “soften up minds,” i.e. help assuage 
Turkish fears that decentralization would not destroy the republic.158 Nonetheless, the 
Constitutional Court saw the party’s rhetoric as a threat to the unitary nature of the state, 
and banned the party in 1998.159 After Elci formed KADEP in 2006, his party’s discourse 
could also be controversial: its unapologetic usage of the term “federalism,” a party 
program that criticizes military meddling in security policy,160 and an insistence on 
explicitly acknowledging the Kurdish nation in the new constitution.161 Thus, while the 
KADEP’s commitment to non-violence certainly contributes to its credibility as a 
moderate actor, in some ways its policy proposals are more radical than those of the 
BDP. 
The Rights and Freedom Party (Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi, HAK-PAR) is 
another pro-Kurdish party that has denounced armed resistance. Founded by Ibrahim 
Guclu and Abdulmelik Firat, son of the famous Kurdish rebel Sheikh Said, 162 HAK-
PAR has been unafraid to criticize the PKK. After a string of terror attacks in 2008, the 
party released a statement stating that “all democrats of Turkey should unite against those 
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who are for guns and violence.”163 It went on to claim that the PKK’s campaign of 
violence was the primary impediment to the formation of a strong Kurdish democratic 
movement.164 In 2012, Gucle submitted a report on intra-PKK murders to a 
parliamentary committee on human rights,165 drawing a sharply worded threat from the 
PKK.166 Since 2012, the party has been lead by Kemal Burkay, a famous Kurdish poet 
and activist who recently returned from three decades of European exile. Burkay has 
publically called for the PKK to lay down its weapons and recommends the BDP clarify 
its democratic autonomy proposal.167 Like KADEP, HAK-PAR asserts that a federal 
system will improve the democracy deficit underlying the Kurdish question, a suggestion 
that nearly led to its closure by the Constitutional Court in 2008.168  
Both KADEP and HAK-PAR have had trouble mustering significant 
electoral support with Kurdish voters. While this may partly be due to federalism’s weak 
support amongst Kurds—only 22 percent are in favor of such a restructuring169—it is 
also a reflection of the difficulty of attracting pro-Kurdish voters without the endorsement 
of Ocalan. After years of keeping their distance from the PKK and its affiliated parties, 
both KADEP and HAK-PAR made pragmatic compromises and joined an electoral 
coalition with BDP and the Labor Party for the 2011 parliamentary elections.170 The 
Labor, Freedom, and Democracy Bloc won 36 seats in the election, but only two non-
BDP politicians—Elci and Leven Tozel of Labor—joined the assembly under the 
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arrangement.171 While HAK-PAR and KADEP attempt to maintain their identity as pro-
Kurdish parties committed to peaceful means, the realities of operating in the polarized 
political landscape have been challenging.  
2. Civil Society Groups 
Over the past decade, Kurds have had far greater opportunities to articulate their 
interests through various civil society organizations. These include organizations 
dedicated to promoting human rights, women’s equality, professional interests, and 
Kurdish culture. Thanks to more liberal laws on language and associations, these groups 
have been freer to articulate messages that emphasize Kurdish identity and demands. 
Like the pro-Kurdish political parties, however, civil associations often face pressure to 
temper their messages. This pressure may come from the state, which is currently holding 
thousands of pro-Kurdish activists imprisoned for alleged ties to terrorist organizations, 
or the PKK itself, which has a history of intimidating its critics. These constraints, 
combined with the popularity of Ocalan, have rewarded actors that tacitly—if not 
directly—support the PKK but manage to avoid state prosecution. Nonetheless, the 
“thickening” of Kurdish civil society helps shape an environment in which political 
demands become more diverse and moderate.  
a. Democratic Society Congress (DTK) 
One of the most important pro-Kurdish civil actors is the Democratic 
Society Congress (Demokratik Toplum Kongresi, DTK), a federation of over 600 
intellectuals, politicians, associations, and NGOs that functions as an advocacy group for 
Kurdish interests.172 Founded in 2007, the DTK includes a diverse group of non-violent 
actors, but it has direct ties to the BDP. The organization is headed by BDP deputy Aysel 
Tugluk and Ahmet Turk, the former chairman of the DTP who was banned from politics 
for five years in 2009. The DTK has claimed its purpose is to develop a roadmap for a 
peace process, but some of its actions have proved divisive. At its congress in July 2011, 
                                                 
171 “Independent Kurdish Deputies join BDP,” World Bulletin, July 1, 2011, http://goo.gl/py4nDm. 
172 Gunter, “The Multifaceted Kurdish Movement,” 81. 
 43 
the DTK created controversy by unilaterally declaring “democratic autonomy” and 
requesting recognition from international actors. The timing of the announcement—just 
hours after a PKK attack killed 13 Turkish soldiers—was criticized not only by Ankara, 
but also by members of the pro-Kurdish movement, including Elci and HAK-PAR’s 
Bayram Bozyel.173 In June 2013, the DTK was a prominent participant in the “North 
Kurdistan Unity and Solution Conference,” which brought together a wide variety of 
political actors, allegedly at the request of Ocalan.174 By referring to Turkey as “North 
Kurdistan”—an expression that would have certainly brought criminal charges a decade 
ago—conference organizers intended to provoke a strong reaction from Turkish 
observers. Similarly, the meeting’s attendees demanded the release of Ocalan and stated, 
“the peoples of Kurdistan have the right to determine their own status in the form of 
autonomy, federation, or independence.”175 The DTK’s inflammatory rhetoric seems to 
indicate that the group, while claiming to democratically represent a diverse group of 
Kurdish activists, operates as the civil arm of the BDP. 
b. Human Rights Association (IHD) 
Another NGO that features prominently in the pro-Kurdish movement is 
the Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği, IHD), the largest human rights 
organization in Turkey. The IHD was founded in 1986 primarily as a response to the 
massive number of leftists imprisoned by the post-coup military administration, but the 
organization has since paid particular attention to human rights violations perpetrated as 
part of the Kurdish conflict, including extralegal murders, torture, and extended 
confinement.176 IHD reports on the conflict, which are widely referenced by foreign 
human rights observers and governments, have greatly increased international awareness 
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of the conflict and applied pressure on Ankara to adhere to EU standards.177 Although 
IHD has urged both the state and the PKK to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, Ankara 
has repeatedly charged the IHD with ties to the PKK. As part of the 2009 KCK sweeps, 
Turkish police raided IHD’s offices and arrested multiple individuals, including the head 
of the organization’s Diyarbakir office, Muharrem Erbey, who has yet to be released.178 
Perhaps Ankara’s interest in the IHD stems from its role as a incubator for prominent 
pro-Kurdish politicians; several of the BDP’s prominent deputies were top leaders of the 
organization, including party co-chair Selahattin Demirtas, Diyarbakir mayor Osman 
Baydemir, Nazmir Gur, and Akin Birdal.179 Whether or not the IHD has direct links to 
the PKK/KCK, the organization has undoubtedly had a moderating influence on the 
Kurdish national movement’s discourse. By shifting its focus from independence to 
human rights, pro-Kurdish advocates legitimized their struggle internationally and 
increased the chances of moderate-moderate cooperation within Turkey. 
c. Other Groups 
Over the last decade, the number of NGOs and associations in the 
southeast has blossomed. While some of these organizations are defined by their 
assertion of Kurdish identity, many are dedicated to causes unrelated to ethnicity. The 
relative pluralism of the civil society has the effect of shaping—and often moderating—
the agendas of political actors, including the state and the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
One notable phenomenon has been the large increase in the number of organizations 
dedicated to furthering women’s rights. One of the first such organizations, the Women’s 
Center (KAMER), initially was criticized by members of the Kurdish national movement 
as being divisive and a distraction from the primary cause. While maintaining its distance 
from the PKK, KAMER has since expanded into over twenty cities and serves as one of 
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the country’s prominent women’s rights organizations.180 Not all influential civil actors 
maintain such clear breaks with militant movement actors, however. The Kurdish 
Language and Education Project, or TZP Kurdi, has achieved notoriety for its 
organization of school boycotts, in which Kurdish families have kept their children at 
home to protest a lack of mother-tongue education. While some in the Turkish press 
criticized the boycotts, which were publicly supported by the PKK and BDP, the protests 
did help elevate the discussion of Kurdish language rights to the national level.181 
Kurdish civil society groups have demonstrated, especially when they join 
forces, the ability to engage directly with important policymakers. In April 2008, a group 
of 17 NGOs from the Southeast met with the prime minister to discuss a roadmap for 
solving the Kurdish question. The group included KAMER, the Diyarbakir Chamber of 
Commerce, the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia Businessmen’s Association 
(GUNSIAD), and the Islamic human rights organization MAZLUM-DER. The 
suggestions of the group were decidedly oriented toward economic solutions—the IHD 
had boycotted the meeting thanks to its focus—but they did include some cultural 
demands: the opening of Kurdish faculties in universities, the use of Kurdish in 
government services, and education in the mother-tongue. Although Erdogan reacted 
harshly to the final suggestion, the exchange represented a remarkable instance of civic 
leaders making direct demands of their leaders in a constructive and moderate manner.182 
One year later, the AKP announced its “Kurdish Opening,” which, although much of the 
package was soon abandoned, included some of the policy changes suggested by the 
group. 
The increasing prominence of interest groups has clearly also had an effect 
on the agendas of the Kurdish national movement. Since the early 2000s, the PKK and its 
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associated organizations have made increasing mention of topics seemingly unrelated to 
its original charter, including environmental conservation and equal rights.183 Two of the 
DTK’s nine commissions, for example, are devoted to women’s rights and ecology.184 
Similarly, at the recent “North Kurdistan” conference discussed earlier, the attendees 
included demands for equal treatment of a variety of minorities, including Armenians and 
Alevis.185 It appears that Ocalan has recognized that the movement’s appeal cannot 
solely be its advocacy of Kurdish identity, and that he must ideologically compete in a 
broader spectrum of political interests. While the PKK and KCK have certainly not 
renounced violence thanks to this phenomenon, it has pushed their discourse towards a 
more moderate middle ground. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In looking at changes in Turkey that may increase the chances of a last resolution 
to the conflict, I concur with Somer that success is largely dependent on cooperation 
between moderates on either side. I have adopted his two-dimensional model for 
assessing whether an actor might serve as a “moderate alternative” to the PKK: it has 
renounced violence and possesses enough ideological flexibility to compromise with its 
counterparts. The first logical candidate for such an actor is the BDP, the latest in a string 
of movement parties that claim no direct ties to the PKK. Like its predecessors, the BDP 
has not grown into a strong actor capable of distancing itself from the PKK for two 
reasons. First, Ankara has created significant impediments to the party’s operations 
through high election thresholds, censorship, arrests, extended detention, and other forms 
of harassment. Second, the BDP has faced significant pressures to align itself with 
Ocalan, both to avoid retribution from the PKK and to prevent alienating its voters, who 
continue to strongly support the jailed terrorist leader. Thanks in part to these restrictions, 
the BDP refuses to condemn violence and continues to operate essentially as the PKK’s 
political wing. Its lack of clout was highlighted vividly during the recent Imrali talks, 
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when it acted merely as Ocalan’s courier and loudspeaker. KADEP and HAK-PAR, 
meanwhile, have largely maintained their solid credentials as moderates, but their lack of 
popular support limits their usefulness as an interlocutor for now. There is some hope, 
however: the mere existence of these smaller parties—and the diminishing harassment 
they receive from Ankara—is evidence that Turkey’s political landscape is now friendlier 
to moderate pro-Kurdish political parties. 
Like the BDP, many influential pro-Kurdish NGOs are associated closely with the 
PKK and KCK. Most prominent of these is the DTK, whose rhetoric closely matches that 
of the BDP. While the IHP has worked hard to develop legitimacy as an impartial human-
rights organization, it continues to be the target of state repression based on alleged ties to 
the KCK. Over the last decade, however, there has been a dramatic “thickening” of civil 
society in the Kurdish-majority southeast. Increasingly diverse actors, who do not base 
their political demands solely on ethnic identity, have engaged with political leaders and 
steered the discourse in a moderate direction. As one women’s rights activist said, 
“Diyarbakır is not just two rival camps as it used to be. There is a big group in the 
middle, watching for whoever is speaking the language of peace.”186 Nonetheless, none 
of these individual actors currently represent a viable alternative to the PKK. As a group, 
however, they have improved the chances that a moderate actor—one that delivers real 
political benefits to the Southeast without resorting to violence or hardline ideology—
may find support in the future. Barring a major turn that severely discredits Ocalan 
amongst his supporters, however, the rise of such an actor may still be years away. 
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III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A SHIFTING BALANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that Turkey transitioned from single-party rule to competitive 
electoral politics in the late 1940s, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) maintained a 
prominent role in state politics for decades afterwards. As discussed in in the literature 
review of Chapter I, a variety of scholars have outlined explanations for Turkey’s unique 
history of civil-military relations. Thanks to the military’s significant political clout, the 
TSK was instrumental in shaping Turkey’s policies surrounding militant Kurdish 
nationalism. As the vanguard of Kemalist ideology, the general staff has consistently 
maintained hardline stances against political measures that acknowledge Kurdish identity 
claims in any form. Instead, it has securitized the Kurdish question by viewing it as a 
problem that can be solved primarily through force. In its effort to end terrorism, 
however, the military permitted a variety of heavy-handed tactics—torture, 
assassinations, and the forced evacuation of villages—that galvanized Kurdish nationalist 
sentiments rather than quelling them. 
Since 1999, the balance of power between Turkey’s military and its civilian 
government has shifted. This change, which began with reforms triggered by Ankara’s 
aspirations of joining the European Union, was a byproduct of the antagonistic 
relationship between the Turkish general staff and AKP leaders during the party’s first 
two terms in office. It was only after a controversial set of coup trials, however, that 
military leaders were placed under greater civilian rule. In this chapter, I argue that the 
recent realignment of Turkish civil-military relations has removed the hardline 
restrictions on Ankara’s policies regarding the Kurdish question, which has increased the 
chances of a negotiated settlement to the conflict in the long term. 
This chapter will proceed with an outline of the dominant role that the Turkish 
military has played in state politics, with an emphasis on its four successful interventions 
since 1960. I will then detail the ways this military influence has specifically shaped the 
state’s response to the PKK insurgency. Discussion will then turn to the key factors and 
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events that have dramatically decreased the armed forces’ influence in Turkish politics 
since 1999, focusing particularly on the effects that this shift has had on the potential 
resolution of the Kurdish conflict. 
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKEY’S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The Turkish military first intervened in state politics on May 27, 1960, when it 
overthrew the government led by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of the Democrat Party 
(DP). The leaders of the coup d’état—mid-level military officers who had grown 
frustrated with the DP’s increasing authoritarianism—formed the National Unity 
Committee (NUC) to serve as an interim military administration until parliamentary 
elections could be held. During the NUC’s one year term, it supervised the drafting of a 
new constitution to replace the 1924 version. The 1961 constitution was considerably 
more liberal and democratic that its predecessor in many ways: it expanded civil liberties 
and social rights, created an independent judiciary, and granted relative autonomy to 
some state agencies.187 Before it handed rule back to civilians, however, the junta made 
sure to create “exit guarantees”: institutional mechanisms for maintaining a degree of 
military control in governance and autonomy from civilian oversight.188 The most 
significant new constitutional body for ensuring military tutelage was the National 
Security Council (MGK), a board made up of high-ranking civilian and military officials. 
The MGK was touted as an independent advisory council, but in practice it worked as a 
means for the general staff to express its views on a broad range of governance issues.189 
Military members of the MGK were also permitted to attend preparatory meetings for 
various cabinet ministries, giving the generals opportunities to interfere in debates across 
a range of issues.190 The new constitution further privileged the armed forces by having 
the chief of the general staff report directly to the prime minister instead of the minister 
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of defense, as is the case in most consolidated democracies.191 This effectively created an 
unofficial deputy prime minister role for the chief of the general staff.192 The junta also 
enshrined significant powers for the military in the TSK Internal Service Law and 
Directive in 1961. Article 85/1 of the directive states, “It is the duty of the Turkish Armed 
Forces to protect the Turkish homeland and the republic, by arms when necessary, 
against internal and external threats.”193 The TSK has used this language to justify 
interventions in state politics in the years since.194 Thanks to the armed forces’ skillful 
creation of tutelary institutions, it enjoyed significant political autonomy after handing 
power back to elected civilians.195  
During the 1960s, Turkey’s political cleavages became more pronounced as left- 
and right-wing groups found it easier to organize under the more liberal constitution. By 
1971, the military used increasing levels of factional violence to justify another 
intervention. On March 12, the chief of the general staff presented Prime Minister 
Suleyman Demirel with an ultimatum: either the government needed to step down, or the 
military would “exercise its constitutional duty” by seizing power.196 After the prime 
minster resigned, the military did not take control of the state directly, but instead it 
mandated the formation of a nonparty government that was largely beholden to the 
mandates of the MGK.197 During the two-year intervention that followed the “coup by 
memorandum,” the government declared martial law and amended the constitution to 
limit civil liberties and increase the powers of the armed forces.198 The amendments gave 
the military significant autonomy from the civilian court system and created independent 
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State Security Courts (SSC), judiciaries made up of civilian and military judges intended 
to handle terror and sedition cases.199 Additionally, the government strengthened the 
military’s influence within the MGK by mandating the TSK representative seats be filled 
by the commanding officers of the various services.200  
During the 1970s, weak coalition governments suffered in popularity thanks to an 
inability to stem political chaos. Radicals on the left and right, as well as Kurdish 
nationalists, engaged in rampant violence that claimed the lives of thousands throughout 
Turkey. Particularly shocking was the May Day massacre of 1977, in which unknown 
gunmen killed 39 protestors in Istanbul’s Taksim Square.201 Using the government’s 
paralysis as justification, the Turkish General Staff announced it was again taking control 
of the state on September 12, 1980. The military administration, led by General Kenan 
Evren, threw out the 1961 constitution and replaced it with one further increasing the 
political influence of the military. Under the 1982 constitution, the president—who had 
traditionally been a retired general—was granted broad powers including the ability to 
deploy the armed forces, appoint the chief of the general staff, and declare martial law.202 
The constitution also increased the membership of the uniformed members of the MGK, 
granting the armed forces “dominance” over the council.203 More significantly, the 
council of ministers was directed to “give priority consideration” to all MGK 
recommendations related to national security.204 Because national security was elsewhere 
defined in extremely broad terms,205 the new constitution effectively granted the MGK 
the means of influencing a wide range of policies including education, labor regulations, 
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local governance, and television broadcasting.206 Before the September 12 coup leaders 
passed on control to elected officials in 1983, the NSC had directed the passage of over 
600 laws that spanned the gamut of policy arenas.207  
The military did not intervene in state governance again until 1997, when it 
compelled the resignation of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan, the leader of 
the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), had been serving for nearly two years as 
prime minister as part of a coalition government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol 
Partisi, DYP) when the general staff decided that he represented a threat to the secular 
nature of the republic. Similar to the intervention of 1971, the generals elected not to 
seize control of the state directly. Instead, the military leadership presented Erbakan with 
an ultimatum in the form of 18 policy “recommendations” during an MGK meeting on 
February 28, 1997. When Erbakan ignored the recommendations—all of which were 
intended to stamp out visible expressions of Islamic political identity—the general staff 
launched a propaganda onslaught portraying the Islamist leader as a reactionary intent on 
destroying Turkey’s secular nature. Eventually, DYP leader Tansu Ciller pulled her party 
out of the ruling coalition, Erbakan resigned, and the RP’s leadership was banned from 
politics. The February 28th “postmodern coup” vividly demonstrated the general staff’s 
ability to topple an elected leader through its political influence.208 
The important role of the Turkish military in state politics has been vividly 
demonstrated four times since 1960. While all of the interventions removed 
democratically elected governments, the armed forces have nonetheless enjoyed 
enormous support from the Turkish public and other key elites, who view the institution 
as the rightful guardian of the state. In the cases where the generals assumed power, they 
did not return control to civilian politicians without first creating exit guarantees that 
enabled them to continue exerting influence. For much of the republic’s history, the 
general staff has thus played a role in shaping state policies. 
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C. THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND THE KURDISH QUESTION 
Since the resurgence of Kurdish nationalist violence in the late 1970s, the military 
has played a central role in dictating the state’s response. As Barkey and Fuller wrote in 
1998, “As the traditional guardian since Ataturk of Turkish security in the broadest sense, 
the military naturally plays the dominant role in not just the execution but also the 
shaping of policy in the Kurdish situation as well.”209 This is not surprising given the 
military’s broad institutional means of influence, its constitutional mission to protect the 
republic, and its fear that Kurdish nationalism is a threat to the country’s territorial 
integrity. As Karaosmanoglu wrote, “In the military's eyes, there are two fundamental 
internal enemies: one is the militant Islamist movements that threaten the secular 
character of the state; the other is the Kurdish separatist movement represented by the 
PKK.”210 Military leaders have formally expressed this view in the National Security 
Policy Document (MGSB), commonly referred to as the “red book,” the secret document 
approved by the MGK that officially delineates state security priorities.211  
Within the MGSB, the Kurdish question is encapsulated under the threat of 
“separatism.” This term—which includes no reference to ethnicity—reflects the military 
leadership’s traditional narrative that the violence in the country’s southeast is due to a 
small group of terrorists that do not represent their fellow citizens. This argument is 
understandable given that Kemalism—the ideology firmly ingrained in military officers 
throughout their education—insists on a unitary Turkish nation free from competing 
identity claims based on ethnicity.212 In this vein, the mere acknowledgement of the 
Kurdish ethnicity was long considering taboo amongst military elites. In the 1990s, for 
example, the general staff published a report claiming that Kurds were an invention of 
foreign imperialists hoping to split the country in the manner of the 1920 Sèvres 
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treaty.213 Similarly, until the mid-1990s, Kurds were commonly referred to as “mountain 
Turks” in order to avoid acknowledging the ethnic group’s existence.214 Given the 
military’s role as the guarantor of Kemalist ideology, the general staff largely held to the 
insistence that the insurgency was a problem of “security, law and order, and violence 
promoted by external powers.”215 The granting of any identity rights or the 
acknowledgement of legitimate political grievances was thus untenable for Turkish 
military brass. Instead, they sought to defeat the PKK militarily and suppress any 
expressions of Kurdish identity.216  
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish military’s strategy formed the basis of 
the state reaction to Kurdish nationalist violence. Following the 1980 coup, the military 
administration deployed over two thirds of the Turkish army to the southeast regions to 
maintain order.217 In order to suppress any expressions of Kurdish identity, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly enacted Law 2932, which prohibited the use of any language 
other than Turkish, even in private conversation.218 Although the military handed control 
of the state to the democratically elected Ozal in 1983, Kenan Evren remained closely 
involved in developing the state’s security policy as president and chairman of the MGK. 
In 1985, the state began attempts to maintain order with the village guard system, but the 
ensuing reprisals and inflamed tribal rivalries escalated violence to new levels.219 Two 
years later, Ankara declared a state of emergency (OHAL) for much of the southeast, 
placing the region as a whole under the rule of an unelected governor with sweeping 
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authorities to counter PKK violence.220 These powers included the forced evacuation of 
Kurdish villages, which eventually resulted in displacement of over one million Kurds. 
Many of the three thousand villages targeted for evacuation were destroyed in the 
process.221 At times, the military’s heavy-handed repressive force did severely weaken 
the PKK’s operational capabilities, especially during the mid-1990s.222 However, 
multiple authors have documented how these measures greatly increased the collective 
sense of Kurdish national identity, strengthened sympathies for the PKK, and motivated 
ordinary Kurds to take up arms against the state security forces.223 
Prior to the AKP, Turgut Özal was the only Turkish leader that successfully 
challenged the armed forces’ monopoly on shaping policies related to the Kurdish 
question and foreign affairs.224 In 1988 and 1991, he convinced the general staff to allow 
Kurdish refugees to cross the border from northern Iraq, which created a host of domestic 
questions about the state’s Kurdish policies. Seeing an opportunity for a political 
opening, Özal revealed his own Kurdish ancestry, admitted past mistakes by the state, 
and partially repealed the ban on languages other than Turkish.225 In February 1993, 
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan declared a ceasefire and passed a peace proposal to Özal 
via Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani that pledged an end to the insurgency in exchange 
for democratic concessions.226 Although Özal appeared serious about accepting the terms 
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of the agreement—he had scheduled an MGK meeting to “seek political solutions to the 
crisis”—he died suddenly on April 17, 1993.227  
After Özal’s death, Turkey’s civilian leaders largely allowed the armed forces to 
set counterterrorism policy as they saw fit.228 In the southeast of Turkey, the result was a 
massive buildup in the number of soldiers and large cross-border operations into Iraq—at 
least one of which was launched without Ankara’s knowledge.229 As the concentration of 
troops increased, nominal civilian oversight of the OHAL governor’s operations 
ended.230 After retirement, Admiral Atilla Kiyat reflected on the problems created by the 
military’s autonomy: 
As soldiers, we define our own strategy, evaluate threats on our own, form 
the force structure that will fight against this threat again on our own . . . 
The civilians do not exercise an effective control of this process. They 
don’t use the rights that the laws have given them.231 
The admiral went on to say that that he felt the military had improperly assessed 
the threat of Kurdish nationalism: 
Mistakes were made back in the 1970s. We built this problem on the 
assumption that Turkey could be divided. If we had built it on the 
assumption that Turkey is strong enough not to be divided . . . perhaps 
there would have been no need for an [armed struggle]. We could have 
chosen to solve this problem by promoting freedom and not prohibitions, 
in which cases our preventative measures would have been different. We 
could have succeeded with such measures in those days.232 
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Although the military was largely autonomous in setting policy, some of the 
blame lay on civilian leaders who preferred to leave strategy to the officers. In a separate 
interview, Kiyat indicated that politicians had told him, “Vice Admiral, if you write 
something, I’ll sign it.”233  
In cases where politicians advocated positions that did not align with that of the 
armed forces, the general staff was not afraid to publicly pressure politicians to rein them 
in. Soon after her election as prime minister, Tansu Ciller suggested that Turkey should 
pursue a “Basque model” as a means of resolving the Kurdish question. Chief of the 
General Staff Dogan Gures immediately rebuked her, publicly advising the prime 
minister that such matters should only be discussed in the MGK.234 According to 
insiders, Gures also manipulated Ciller’s Kurdish policy direction behind closed doors, 
and before long she had transformed into a hardliner on the issue.235 In the eyes of 
scholar Gerassimos Karabelias, the military’s influence over civilian politicians was most 
obvious in 1994, when—under Ciller’s premiership—the parliament, Constitutional 
Court, and state security courts acted in unison to lift the immunity of Kurdish deputies of 
the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP), arrest the politicians on 
terrorism charges, and close the party.236 
One of the least understood aspects of Ankara’s struggle against Kurdish 
nationalism is the role of the deep state (derin devlet), a shadowy network of military 
officers, intelligence operatives, and their civilian allies dedicated to eliminating threats 
to the secular state through extralegal means. According to Gareth Jenkins, the deep state 
was not a centrally controlled organization, but instead loosely affiliated nationalist gangs 
and organized crime syndicates that enjoyed immunity from prosecution thanks to their 
personal connections with state elites or the Gendarmerie Intelligence (Jandarma 
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İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, JITEM).237 Although details are sketchy, there is 
evidence that killing squads affiliated with the deep state were responsible for thousands 
of assassinations and disappearances as part of a “dirty war” against the PKK in the 
southeast during the 1980s and 1990s.238 Although the existence of the deep state had 
been rumored for decades, it was first exposed to the public through a shocking scandal 
in November 1996. In the incident, a car crash killed three and injured one near the town 
of Susurluk. It was soon revealed that the occupants of the car, which had firearms and 
silencers in the trunk, included a sitting member of parliament, a former Istanbul police 
chief, and a wanted ultranationalist mafia leader carrying state-issued false 
identification.239 The Susurluk incident revealed secret connections between Ankara and 
violent criminals, and although it resulted in no convictions, many Turks saw the event as 
proof of the state’s willingness to use illegal methods to silence its enemies. 
As the vanguard of Kemalist ideology, Turkish military leaders have been largely 
unwilling to concede the legitimacy of Kurdish identity claims or consider the usefulness 
of democratic measures in attempting to end the conflict. Instead, they have viewed the 
PKK insurgency as a security problem that should be solved via military measures. With 
the exception of Turgut Ozal, Turkish politicians prior to the AKP were unwilling or 
unable to challenge the general staff’s authority on the matter, which largely allowed the 
military brass to set their own counterterrorism strategy. The resultant heavy-handed 
approach may have come close to crippling the PKK’s military capacity, but it also 
provoked the strong backlash of Kurdish nationalism that has perpetuated the conflict.  
D. THE DECLINING POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TURKISH 
ARMED FORCES  
When the AKP entered power in November 2002, many observers had high 
expectations that the party would improve Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish citizens. 
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As a party with Islamist pedigree, it shared with Kurdish activists the view that the 
excesses of the early Kemalist reforms had created some of the state’s most fundamental 
problems. Yet, while the party did oversee some modest improvements in language and 
broadcasting rights after entering office, the AKP was unable to make significant 
headway towards ending the insurgency of the PKK. This lack of progress was due to 
restrictions imposed on the party by the general staff. Thanks to the TSK’s history of 
interventions—including most recently against Erdogan and Gul’s former Welfare 
Party—it was understandable that party leaders were especially sensitive to the “red 
lines”240 set by the military brass. A former U.S. ambassador reported that AKP leaders 
spent their first term living in fear of a coup241, but in 2013, the situation now stands 
radically changed. In the past twelve months, hundreds of military officers have been 
convicted of terrorism in civilian courts and Ankara has started public negotiations with 
Abdullah Ocalan. How did Turkey’s power balance shift so dramatically in just over a 
decade? How does this recent history shed light on prospects for an end to the conflict? In 
this section, I will outline the remarkable series of events that have marked the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ loss of political influence.  
1. EU Accession Reforms 
One factor that has played a critical role in normalizing Turkish civil-military 
relations has been the country’s attempt to join the EU. Although the AKP has often been 
cited as being particularly open to EU membership, it cannot claim to be responsible for 
the pursuit. The accession process formally began in December 1999 with the EU’s 
declaration of Turkey as a candidate state, and Turkish governments had been cultivating 
ties with Brussels for decades prior.242 Although Turkey had officially started the 
process, its accession was contingent upon the country making a broad set of reforms that 
would bring it into compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. The same month that 
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Turkey’s candidacy became official, the effects of EU contingency on Ankara’s approach 
to the Kurdish question started becoming apparent: the government elected to grant 
Ocalan a stay of execution, and the MGK elected to gradually end emergency rule in the 
southeast of Turkey by 2002.243 In addition, the national assembly began passing a series 
of legislative harmonization packages and constitutional amendments that would 
incrementally bring Turkey into compliance with EU standards.244 By the time the AKP 
took office, the parliament had passed three reform packages and a constitutional 
amendment that improved civil liberties, most notably by reducing restrictions on the use 
of spoken or written Kurdish.245 The changes also decreased some of the military’s 
institutional powers: military judges were removed from state security courts, thereby 
increasing the independence of the judiciary, and the MGK was reformed. With the new 
changes, the MGK’s civilian members now outnumbered their military counterparts and 
cabinet ministers were no longer constitutionally mandated to “give priority to the 
recommendations made by the MGK.”246 
After the AKP took office, the party accelerated the EU reform legislation 
process. In 2003 and 2004, the general assembly passed harmonization packages that 
substantially reduced the military’s autonomy and political influence. These 
“momentous”247 reforms ended MGK military members’ unfettered access to civilian 
agencies, declassified its decrees, reduced the frequency of meetings, and mandated the 
body’s secretary general—a non-voting yet influential member of the council—be a 
civilian.248 The packages also significantly increased the degree of civilian oversight over 
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the budget of the armed forces.249 In 2004, a constitutional amendment abolished the 
controversial state security courts altogether and officially banned the death penalty,250 a 
change that had been vigorously promoted by the EU since Ocalan’s capture.251 The 
amendment also stipulated that when domestic laws and international agreements came 
into conflict, Ankara would honor the latter, which motivated many Turkish citizens to 
begin petitioning the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to intervene in human 
rights cases.252 
The EU reforms enacted by Ankara between 1999 and 2004 effectively rolled 
back many of the authoritarian aspects of the 1982 constitution that restricted civil 
liberties and codified institutional privileges for the armed forces. Given the remarkable 
curbs on the powers of the military brought by the changes, it is not surprising that the 
general staff voiced its protest. In May 2003, the MGK’s last military secretary general, 
General Tuncer Kilinc, publically expressed his resentment of the reform packages by 
suggesting that rather than pursuing membership in the EU, “Turkey should perhaps seek 
other alignments with such countries as Iran and Russia.”253 Three months later, after the 
parliament passed the summer 2003 reform package that gave his job to a civilian, Kilinc 
sharply criticized the changes as a threat to national security: 
[This] reform package has rendered the MGK functionless. Political Islam 
and ethnic separatism remain to be serious threats. The appointment of a 
civilian secretary-general to that body would politicize it. One should not 
have weakened the MGK for the sake of democracy and the EU.254 
After a series of similar incidents in which his subordinates openly weighed in on 
politics, Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok, who was largely in favor of EU 
accession, provided his fellow generals with a memorable rebuke: 
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At this time my co-commanders are disclosing their views on a number of 
issues. One should take these statements as their personal opinions. I am 
not saying that my co-commanders’ views are wrong. Nor am I saying that 
they are right. Let me, however, point out that it would have been better if 
they had made those views public after they had retired.255 
Verbal disagreements such as these have been highly unusual amongst high-ranking 
Turkish military officers, who largely maintain a unified front. This exchange thus 
illustrates that EU accession—and the reduction in political power it brought the 
military—created divisions within the top echelons of the military elite. 
2. AKP’s First Term: Gradual Escalation  
For much of the AKP’s first five-year term, the armed forces and the new 
government avoided direct confrontations. The occasional public complaint aside, the 
generals were largely accepting of the reforms required by the EU accession process, a 
cornerstone of the AKP agenda. As Umut Cizre has argued, the military was forced to 
choose between challenging a widely supported initiative of the popular new government 
or accepting some political restraints; out of self-preservation, it chose the latter.256 
Because the PKK observed a ceasefire between 1999 and 2004, Kurdish nationalism did 
not provoke sharp debates about the importance of fighting terrorism during the AKP’s 
first few years in office, which decreased the military’s justifications for imposing its 
influence in the political sphere.  
During the AKP’s first term, the primary source of tension between the armed 
forces and the government was the latter’s overtly Islamic identity. Despite party leaders’ 
insistence that the AKP was a conservative democratic party with no Islamist aspirations, 
many high-ranking Turkish officers had difficulty stomaching what they perceived as 
threats to the secular nature of the state. This conflict became obvious April 2003, when 
the general staff, along with President Ahmet Sezer and representatives of the Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), elected to boycott the traditional 
Children’s Day reception held by Speaker of the Parliament Bulent Arinc because his 
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wife, who wears an Islamic headscarf, would be attending the event.257 Following an 
MGK meeting a week later, the council released a statement indicating that during the 
meeting “stress [had] been made to the importance and the need to diligently protect the 
principle of secularism, which is one of the main pillars of the state.”258 Shortly after, the 
general staff issued a statement declaring, 
It should not be forgotten that the united and unified Turkish Armed 
Forces are today, as they were in the past, the greatest guarantee of the 
secular, democratic and social characteristics of the Turkish Republic and 
shall remain at the service of our exalted nation.259 
This thinly veiled threat of intervention illustrated that the armed forces were 
willing to pressure the civilian government to adhere to its demands regarding what it 
considered to be threats to the state. 
Despite the military’s warning to the government regarding secularism, AKP 
leaders elected to push the military’s boundaries on its other declared threat: Kurdish 
nationalism. In August 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan signaled a new approach to the 
issue, saying “the Kurdish problem is my problem,” and “we will solve all problems 
through democracy.”260 The pronouncements spurred an immediate condemnation from 
General Ozkok, who declared, “The biggest problem facing Turkey is that of separatist 
movements which resort to terrorism as a means to achieve their objectives.”261 As with 
the headscarf case, the military used the next MGK meeting to issue a stern warning to 
the prime minister against making such statements without first consulting the 
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military.262 The council’s public statement included a reminder for the government that 
its duties included “protecting the independence and integrity of the nation and 
indivisibility of the country.”263 The military was not alone in criticizing Erdogan’s new 
initiative; CHP leader Deniz Baykal asserted, “terrorism in Turkey is politically planned 
and cannot be resolved by democratic means.”264  
Cizre argues that the sharp and unified response from the military and its 
Kemalist supporters convinced Erdogan to abandon ideas of addressing the Kurdish 
question through democratic reforms. An increase in PKK violence over the following 
year, which incited a backlash of “street nationalism” amongst Turks, instead pushed the 
AKP to align its policies with the traditional securitization mindset of the armed 
forces.265 The pressure on AKP leaders also increased in July 2006, when General Yasar 
Buyukanit succeeded Ozkok as the chief of the general staff. While Ozkok had 
reluctantly accepted AKP oversight, he represented a minority in the general corps; 
Buyukanit was far more representative of the Kemalist generals that saw the party as a 
mortal threat and demanded it take a firmer stance on terrorism.266 Only a month prior, 
the parliament passed amendments to the Anti-Terror Law 3713 (TMK) that broadened 
the definition of terrorism to include a variety of non-violent acts, increased the sentences 
for terror offenses, and gave judges the prerogative to close media outlets.267 Thousands 
of political protestors have since been imprisoned under the revised statute.268 The 
change to the law was indicative of a gradual shift away from the AKP’s democratization 
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agenda that had been such a large part of their early platform. Multiple scholars have 
argued that while pressure from the armed forces partially accounts for the change, some 
of the realignment was likely due to growing disenchantment with the EU accession 
process, which began derailing in 2006. With the promise of membership looking less 
likely in the near term, the AKP was less motivated to take domestic political risks in the 
name of democratic reforms.269 
Although the AKP may have partly aligned with the military on matters of 
security policy, tensions between the party and the general staff reached new heights in 
2007. In February, Prime Minister Erdogan announced that he planned to establish 
diplomatic ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of northern Iraq to help 
quell PKK violence. Days later, General Buyukanit declared that the KRG’s political 
parties were supporting the PKK, and that he had nothing to say to them. After 
Erdogan—who typically downplayed public disagreements with military leaders—
suggested that Buyukanit was merely expressing his personal opinion, the general staff 
issued a statement clarifying that he was speaking for the institution.270  
In the months following the showdown, the AKP made preparations to put 
forward either Erdogan or Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as a nominee for president. 
Many nationalist Turks were incensed by the prospect of a politician of Islamist pedigree 
assuming the role of head of state, which they viewed as a secular and apolitical post.271 
In April 2007, a number of nationalist civil society groups organized mass rallies 
throughout the country to protest the prospective nomination of the AKP ministers. On 
April 12, Buyukanit weighed in on the matter by indirectly encouraging the protests and 
stating, “we hope that someone will be elected president who is attached to the basic 
values of the republic, not just in words but in spirit.”272 The general’s statement—made 
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just two weeks before the elections—was a clear reference to the “radical doubt” many 
Kemalists felt regarding the AKP’s commitment to secularism.273 On the evening of 
April 27, the national assembly conducted an inconclusive first round of presidential 
voting with Gul as the only candidate. Hours later, a shocking statement appeared on the 
general staff’s website that appeared to threaten an intervention: 
The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused 
on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about 
the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed 
Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender [sic] of 
secularism . . . It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly 
whenever it is necessary.274  
The AKP, having tolerated the meddling of the general staff for nearly five years, took 
the opportunity of the “e-memorandum” to finally stand up to the military.  The 
following day, the AKP issued an uncharacteristically defiant statement: 
It is inconceivable in a democratic state that the general staff would use 
any phrase against the government on any matter . . . the chief of general 
staff, in terms of his duty and authority, is accountable to the prime 
minister.275    
Thanks to the deadlock caused by the CHP’s boycott of the next round of voting, 
parliament was forced to call for early general elections. The general staff, having drawn 
criticism for their intervention from international and domestic actors for all political 
stripes, had little choice but to sit and await the results. The July elections—which the 
AKP won with a remarkable 46 percent of the vote—served to dramatically undercut the 
military’s challenge to the party. 276 Four months later, Gul was sworn in as president. 
After emerging victorious from the dramatic showdown with the armed forces, AKP took 
a more aggressive approach to asserting civilian rule over the military. 
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3. AKP’s Second Term: The Military on the Defensive 
The AKP’s second term began with the party in a substantially more confident 
position vis-à-vis the military and its Kemalist allies. In February 2008, the AKP chose to 
capitalize on its renewed mandate by introducing a controversial constitutional 
amendment that would lift the headscarf ban in universities. Although the amendment 
passed the parliament thanks to a coalition with the National Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi, MHP), the Constitutional Court would later strike it down. Citing the 
amendment as evidence of the party’s violation of secularism, the chief prosecutor 
initiated proceedings to close the AKP in March 2008. By a margin of only one vote, the 
Constitutional Court ruled in July that the party could remain open, but that it would have 
to forfeit a portion of its campaign funds due to its alleged anti-secular activities.277  
The AKP, which had been the target of attacks for much of its existence, had 
survived two existential threats in less than a year and earned outstanding popular 
support. The armed forces and secular elites could not deny the reality that a dramatic 
power shift was underway. What they did not know then, however, was that that a 
massive wave of investigations, arrests, and trials would soon deliver the deathblow that 
consolidated Turkish civilian rule over the military. The first indication that Turkey’s 
military elite was in trouble had actually arrived in March 2007, when Nokta magazine 
published what it claimed were excerpts from the journals of Admiral Ozden Ornek, the 
former commander of the navy. The alleged diaries—which Ornek claimed were 
forgeries—outlined an operation known as “Blonde Girl,” in which the armed forces 
would incite domestic unrest in order to justify a coup against the AKP.278 In June, the 
plot thickened when police discovered a crate of 27 grenades hidden in an Istanbul house 
owned by a retired army officer. Soon thereafter, prosecutors announced that they had 
tied the grenades to a number of terror attacks spanning the previous nine years. Over the 
next few years, hundreds of seemingly unrelated individuals—active and retired military 
officers, academics, leftists, lawyers, and media personalities—were arrested for their 
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alleged membership in an organization known as Ergenekon, a nationalist network 
reminiscent of the deep state.279  
As the Ergenekon investigation proceeded, it divided the Turkish public. While 
some AKP voters saw the case as a long-overdue dose of justice for the authoritarian 
guardians of the state, many secular Turks alleged the affair to be a massive sham 
orchestrated by the AKP to eliminate its political rivals.280 The country’s print media 
similarly divided into two camps; while the Islamic-rooted Zaman (and its English 
version Today’s Zaman) and leftist Taraf published every detail of the allegations as fact, 
writers for traditionally nationalist papers such as Hurriyet (and Hurriyet Daily News) 
were far more likely to dismiss the prosecutors’ claims.281 Regardless of the veracity of 
evidence, however, the coup investigations that began in 2007 slowly chipped away at 
the military’s public reputation and political stature, continuing the realignment of 
Turkey’s civil-military balance. 
In addition to allegations about illegal conspiracies, the armed forces began to 
receive criticism about their competency during the AKP’s second term. In October 2008, 
PKK militants ambushed an army outpost near Aktutun, killing seventeen soldiers. Soon 
after, Taraf published allegations that the armed forces possessed prior intelligence that 
an attack was forthcoming, but did not act to prevent it. General Ilker Basbug, the new 
chief of the general staff, responded by warning the media: “Those, who despite 
everything show this attack of the terror organization as a success story, share 
responsibility for the bloodshed . . . I call on everyone to act with caution and stand in the 
correct spot.”282 The general’s harsh statements launched a firestorm of protests from 
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other media outlets,283 which had grown more comfortable criticizing the previously 
unimpeachable armed forces in the wake of the coup investigations. Rather than seizing 
on an opportunity to further humiliate the armed forces, Erdogan backed Basbug: “There 
is no place for weakness or hesitation in this fight. No one should even attempt to show 
our security forces as being weak or hesitant. We have lost some of our youngest sons to 
this.”284 Erdogan’s response to the exchange demonstrated the careful balancing act he 
would attempt in the coming years; while he certainly was benefitting from the slipping 
stature of the armed forces, he sought to avoid the appearance of a partisan cheering on 
the weakening of a respected Turkish institution.   
In 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan, emboldened by the military’s defensive 
position, again elected to pursue a new series of Kurdish policies. On January 1, Erdogan 
helped launch the state-run Kurdish channel TRT Six by speaking in Kurdish during the 
initial broadcast, a gesture that would have been unimaginable only years earlier.285 Later 
in the year, he and President Gul began making promises of democratic reforms and 
amnesty for PKK militants in hopes of finally ending the long insurgency. In response to 
the “Kurdish Opening,” as the initiative came to be called, the military attempted to exert 
its influence to reign in the PM. In a public statement in August, General Basbug stated, 
“the Turkish Armed Forces will not allow harm to be done to the unitary state structure,” 
a clear reference to potential proposals for autonomy or a federal system.286 He similarly 
cautioned that any form of direct negotiations with the PKK would cross one of the 
military’s “red lines.”287 Despite the general’s warnings, Erdogan elected to push 
forward with the opening in a clear demonstration that the military had lost much of its 
ability to pressure civilian leaders. In October, the Kurdish Opening came to ignominious 
end thanks to a public relations disaster when images of PKK militants openly 
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celebrating their return to Turkey sparked a strong nationalist backlash. Any promises of 
further reforms were temporarily shelved, but it was popular opinion—not the general 
staff—that had thwarted the initiative.     
The armed forces continued to suffer the erosion of their public stature and 
institutional privileges in 2010. A new coup investigation began in February that would 
come to implicate hundreds of active duty and retired military officers for their alleged 
participation in an operation known as Sledgehammer. According to prosecutors, top-
ranking generals had developed plans in 2003 to foment civil unrest as a pretext for a 
coup.288 Later in the year, the AKP proposed a major constitutional amendment 
incorporating multiple provisions that would further decrease the autonomy of the armed 
forces, including allowing military members to be tried in civilian courts. The 
amendment was put to a nationwide referendum on September 12, the symbolic 
anniversary of the 1980 coup, and it passed handily with 58 percent of the vote.289 It was 
yet another demonstration that a majority of the Turkish public supported the retreat of 
the armed forces from the political sphere.  
4. The AKP’s Third Term: The Final Nail in the Coffin 
 In the November 2011 general elections, the AKP earned an unprecedented 50 
percent of the popular vote, further reinforcing its mandate. Meanwhile, the armed 
forces’ reputation had suffered in light of the expanding Sledgehammer and Ergenekon 
investigations. While over 90 percent of Turks expressed high confidence in the military 
in 2002, that figure had dropped to only 60 percent by 2011.290 In contrast, the public has 
gained trust in the civilian leadership. While only 29 percent of respondents in 2000 had a 
significant amount of confidence in the government, a 2011 poll put the figure at 61 
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percent.291 The numbers were a telling sign that Turkey’s era of military tutelage had 
come to an end.  
 In August 2012, the Sledgehammer verdicts were announced: over 320 suspects 
were found guilty of acts of treason. Those convicted included three retired service 
commanders, who all received 20 year sentences for their alleged leadership roles in a 
terrorist organization. After four days of silence following the momentous 
announcements, the general staff’s response amounted to little more than a whimper: 
“We deeply feel and share the sadness that our comrade friends—with whom we have 
worked together for many years—and their precious families have been living.”292 
Although the general staff indicated it looked forward to the appeals verdict, which is due 
in October 2013, 293 it expressed no outrage or calls for public protest. 
In December 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan announced the start of negotiations 
between the government and Abdullah Ocalan toward a possible peace agreement. 
Although Ankara had previously talked secretly with the PKK, the revelations reflected 
an unprecedented willingness of the government to negotiate directly with Ocalan on 
potentially significant political concessions. Although some opposition political groups 
howled in protest at the AKP’s audacity, there was one voice noticeably absent from the 
dissent: the general staff. While only seven years earlier, military leadership lashed out at 
the mention of the words “Kurdish problem” and “democracy” in the same sentence, the 
generals were now forced to sit and watch silently as Erdogan ordered the armed forces 
to allow PKK militants to retreat—with their weapons—across the border to Iraq.294 
While it is possible the Imrali peace process may not end the Kurdish conflict 
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permanently, it serves as convincing evidence that civilian politicians are now firmly in 
control of Turkey’s security policy. 
After a five-year trial, the Ergenekon case concluded in August 2013 with the 
conviction of 275 defendants. Nineteen of the suspects, including former chief of the 
general staff Ilker Basbug, received life sentences for their roles in the alleged terrorist 
organization. Like the Sledgehammer case before it, the most notable aspect of the 
verdict was the relative silence from the general staff and influential institutions of the 
secular elite. Soon after the verdict, Basbug issued a letter calling for General Necdet 
Ozel, the current chief of the general staff, to publically speak out against the verdicts, 
but Ozel remained silent.295 It appeared that the divisions amongst Turkey’s general 
staff—which had first become evident during the early EU reforms—had only worsened 
over time. While the Ergenekon verdicts will also be appealed, the anticlimactic end to 
the long saga only served to further humiliate Turkey’s military brass.   
E. CONCLUSION 
For much of the republic’s history, the Turkish Armed Forces played a central 
role in politics. While Turkey began democratic consolidation soon after World War II, a 
combination of cultural, institutional, and structural factors allowed the military to 
maintain significant autonomy and political influence. The military repeatedly showed its 
willingness to directly seize power directly in the coups of 1960 and 1980; similarly, it 
compelled transitions in 1971 and 1997. Partly as a result of the interventions, the armed 
forces forged unique institutional mechanisms of exerting influence over state policy 
under the broad mandate of protecting the state’s secular and unitary nature. The most 
important of these was the National Security Council (MGK), which was considered by 
many to be a secretive “parallel government” that the general staff dominated. The most 
important component of the armed forces’ influence, however, was its unrivaled 
popularity with the Turkish people.  
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Thanks to its influence—and the willingness of most civilian leaders to abdicate 
security matters to the generals—the military largely dictated Turkey’s policies regarding 
the Kurdish question. As guarantors of the Kemalist ideology that demanded a unitary 
national identity based on Turkishness, the general staff had little choice but to insist that 
PKK terrorism be dealt with largely as a security problem. While the general staff 
conceded social and economic factors might have played a role in the violence, there was 
no consideration for political grievances based on ethnic identity claims. The resulting 
policies—a heavy military presence, village guards, emergency rule, village evacuations, 
and a dirty war waged by the shadowy deep state—were unable to end the scourge of 
militant nationalist violence and reinforced sentiments of Kurdish identity. 
The AKP entered power in 2002 having promised to prioritize democratization 
and EU accession. In order to meet the Copenhagen criteria, Ankara passed a series of 
reforms that significantly undercut the Turkish Armed Forces’ institutional influence, 
particularly via the MGK. Thanks to the overwhelming popularity of EU accession and 
internal divisions amongst the generals, the armed forces put up little resistance to the 
changes. Having lost their primary institutional method of steering policy, the general 
staff increasingly applied pressure to AKP politicians via public pronouncements. For 
much of the party’s first term, this method managed to keep the AKP’s Kurdish policy 
aligned with that of the armed forces. General Buyukanit’s clumsy “e-memorandum,” 
however, turned out to be a major misstep, and the AKP came out of the showdown with 
a renewed popular mandate.  
Over the next several years, what remained of the armed forces’ political power 
was finally erased through the highly divisive Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, which 
resulted in the convictions of over 500 individuals. With the military defanged, Prime 
Minister Erdogan was able to publically announce negotiations with PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan, a move that would have been unthinkable just years earlier. The current 
peace process faces many obstacles including insufficient transparency, significant public 
resistance to concessions, and the exclusion of opposition voices. Similarly, the 
questionable legitimacy of the recent trials of military leaders is indicative of an 
increasingly authoritarian streak by the AKP. Nonetheless, by ending the political role of 
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Turkey’s military brass—whose hardline approach to the Kurdish conflict has been 
counterproductive for years—the AKP has increased the long-term chances for a peaceful 
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IV. THE RESURGENCE OF OTTOMAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, there has been undeniable increase in the visibility of 
Islamic identity in Turkey’s social and political spheres. Evidence of these changes is 
hard to miss: the unprecedented electoral power of a party with an Islamist pedigree, an 
explosion of religious private schools throughout the country, and the greater visibility of 
covered women in universities and corporate offices. Similarly, the country’s top 
politicians and civil leaders have often evoked memories of the Ottoman era to help 
frame solutions to current political crises. The echoes of this imperial nostalgia are 
evident in speeches on foreign policy, in the themes of the country’s most popular 
television shows, and in debates over the architecture of Istanbul.  
In examining Turkey’s long struggle with militant Kurdish nationalism, it is worth 
considering the political ramifications of this apparent “neo-Ottoman” revival. Pious 
politicians, who long shared a marginalized political status with Kurdish nationalists, 
have historically been more willing to recognize claims that challenge Kemalist notions 
of a unitary Turkish nation. Turgut Ozal, an openly pious leader who regularly evoked 
memories of Ottoman greatness, broke ground by acknowledging the Kurdish problem 
and advocating for increased cultural rights in the late 1980s. In 2002, the AKP won 
considerable electoral support amongst Kurds in hopes it would similarly adopt a 
conciliatory approach. While the party has recently presided over unprecedented 
negotiations with jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the AKP’s overall legacy on the 
Kurdish question is yet to be written. Although a variety of factors will continue to shape 
the ongoing attempts at a peaceful solution, this chapter will focus specifically on the 
discourse of the country’s most influential Islamic actors: the AKP and the socio-political 
movement lead by Fethullah Gulen, which reaches a massive audience through its 
international network of schools and media outlets. The statements of these organizations 
are important to review because, as Umit Gunes states, “the success of political 
reconciliation and conflict resolution is strongly connected to building a national 
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consensus.”296 In looking at the discourse specifically related to the Kurdish question, 
some important questions arise: Have Turkey’s influential Islamic actors contributed 
unique ideas to the national discussion on the Kurdish question? Have these ideas 
resonated with the public and political elites? Are Ottoman-Islamic concepts useful in 
redefining traditional notions of national identity? Have the Islamic credentials of these 
actors helped legitimize politically contentious concepts and foster dialogue between the 
country’s opposed factions? 
This chapter argues that the assertion of an Ottoman-Islamic identity has been 
useful in building consensus on resolving Turkey’s Kurdish question, but with a critical 
caveat. While an emphasis on Islamic brotherhood may reinforce bonds between 
Turkey’s citizens, such platitudes are of limited value if core political grievances also are 
not addressed. Meeting some fundamental Kurdish nationalist demands—multilingual 
education and a constitution free of references to Turkishness—has proven politically 
difficult due to official Kemalist concepts of a unitary Turkish nation. By legitimizing 
Ottoman-Islamic identity over traditional Kemalist concepts, Turkey’s pious politicians 
have highlighted the obstacle of ethno-nationalism and improved the chances that the 
Turkish public can accept a redefined identity based on equality. 
B. OTTOMAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITY IN A SECULAR REPUBLIC 
During the first years of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal sought to obliterate 
nearly all links with the Ottoman Islamic past through a dramatic set of reforms. Having 
ended the 623-year reign of the sultanate in 1922, Kemal persuaded the parliamentary 
assembly to also abolish the institution of the caliphate, the symbolic leader of Sunni 
Islam, two years later.297 Continuing with efforts to decrease the remnants of religion in 
governance, Ankara abolished sharia courts and adopted a legal system based on Swiss 
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Civil Code.298 He also closed all medreses, the religious schools where many Turks 
received their only formal education, and banned the Sufi orders (tarikats), which had 
served as important religious institutions.299 As part of his modernization efforts, Kemal 
also ordered the abandonment of a variety of Ottoman customs in favor of European 
customs. The fez, the ubiquitous hat of Muslim men, was banned and Kemal publically 
discouraged females from wearing traditional headscarves. The Gregorian calendar 
replaced the Islamic calendar and the national day of rest moved from Friday to Sunday. 
In 1928, an amendment to the Turkish constitution removed any reference to Islam as the 
official state religion.300 That same year, Kemal introduced perhaps the most significant 
discontinuity when he ordered the wholesale shift from Arabic-Persian script to a 
modified Latin alphabet, rendering all future generations incapable of directly engaging 
with Ottoman history.301  
In addition to ordering the abandonment of past practices, Kemal attempted to 
replace the nation’s troublesome Ottoman legacy with a new, more grandiose national 
mythology. He commissioned academics to produce a new official Turkish historical 
narrative, which credited the nation’s pre-Islamic ancestors with bringing civilization 
from central Asia to much of the Western world, including the Greeks and Romans.302 
Similarly, an Austrian scholar in Kemal’s employ authored the “sun-language theory,” 
which claimed that an early Turkic dialect was the predecessor of all modern 
languages.303 Throughout the country, state officials replaced markers of Ottoman history 
with monuments to the first “Turkish” civilization of Anatolia, the Hittites of the second 
millennium BC. Notably, the official symbol of the new Turkish capital, Ankara, was a 
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Hittite sun until the 1980s.304 The promotion of the newly discovered national identity 
and the denigration of the Ottoman past were also perpetuated through school 
textbooks305 and the state-controlled print media.306 Although Kemal’s revisionist 
projects were questionable scientifically,307 they provided the nation-building project 
with a unifying historical narrative that largely ignored the Ottoman-Islamic past in favor 
of tales of ancient greatness.308 
Despite the ambitious attempts of Kemal, many Turkish citizens were not ready to 
discard their Muslim identity and Ottoman heritage. While the Sheikh Said rebellion, the 
largest of 19 insurrections between 1924 and 1938, was largely a bid for Kurdish 
autonomy, many of those who joined were motivated by anger over the abolition of the 
caliphate.309 Ankara was also alarmed by the 1930 Menemen incident, in which a Sufi 
sheikh led a protest demanding sharia law and beheaded a military officer.310 Similarly, 
four smaller protests between 1925 and 1933 were responses to the fez ban and the new 
requirement for mosques to make the call to prayer (ezan) in Turkish instead of the 
traditional Arabic.311 The public’s underlying dissatisfaction over the reforms became 
more evident as Turkey’s single-party rule and state-controlled media began slowly 
liberalizing after World War II. Leading up to the first multiparty elections in 1950, at 
least 13 new political parties ran on platforms emphasizing Muslim identity and 
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criticizing Kemalist secularism.312 In recognition of the public’s demands, even 
politicians from the late Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) began openly 
attending mosques, reintroducing religious education, and permitting Turks to again join 
the hajj pilgrimage in Mecca.313 
In the 1950 general assembly elections, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) 
convincingly defeated the CHP by appealing to what Serif Mardin defined as the 
“periphery” of Turkish political culture: provincial citizens grounded in Islamic values 
who had grown frustrated with the Kemalist-dominated center.314 Capitalizing on its 
mandate to address the excesses of secular reforms, the new government made one of its 
first initiatives the return of the ezan to the traditional Arabic, a move which was widely 
popular.315 The DP also ended the persecution of banned Sufi brotherhoods, most notably 
the Naksibendis and Nurcus, the followers of Said Nursi.316 These Islamic networks, 
which had operated underground since 1925, served as an important segment of the DP’s 
electoral base throughout the 1950s; they have continued to grow in influence ever since. 
One result was the dramatic increase in state-run Imam Hatip (Islamic preacher) schools, 
institutions for children that provided seven years of dual instruction in secular and 
religious curricula.317 These schools, which helped strengthen the mobilization of 
Turkey’s Islamic movements, have continued to be a controversial component of the 
state’s religion policies ever since.  
The DP not only promoted the public practice of Islam through policy, but it 
challenged the Kemalist historical narrative that had denigrated the Ottoman past. During 
a debate in the General Assembly in 1950, the DP Education Minister argued for the 
restoration of Ottoman mausoleums, which Ataturk had closed in 1925. Harkening the 
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memory of the sultan that had conquered Istanbul in 1453, he stated, “Just as our children 
visit Ataturk’s tomb, so too will they visit the tomb of Fatih Sultan Mehmed.”318 Three 
years later, when the 500-year anniversary of the conquest arrived, the event was marked 
by a ten-day celebration prominently featuring prayers heralding the importance of the 
Ottoman victory in Islamic and Turkish history.319 Similarly, school textbooks and 
popular print media of the 1950s began portraying the imperial era in a far more 
favorable light than what had been acceptable during previous decades.320 It was under 
the DP’s ten-year rule that social and political discourse on the nation’s Ottoman-Islamic 
history first showed a departure from the official Kemalist narrative. 
In 1960, the Turkish military overthrew the DP in a coup d’état. Citing the 
“unconstitutional” rule of the DP, they seized control of the state, hanged Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes, and drafted a new constitution. The coup and subsequent military rule 
established that the armed forces had assumed guardianship of the state and its Kemalist 
ideology. Even after power was handed back to democratically elected parties, the 
general staff shaped state policy through their role in the newly formed National Security 
Council (MGK). Nonetheless, the new constitution was comparatively liberal, granting 
increased civil liberties and tolerance for political associations. This political opening 
extended to religious institutions as well. Rather than clamp down on Islamist 
movements, the state attempted to thwart radical ideologies by emphasizing religious 
education that promoted a “modern, rationalist version of Islam.”321 
The post-coup government’s co-option of religion as a counter to leftist ideologies 
marked a trend that would continue for the next few decades. This instrumentalization of 
religion benefitted from a new current of conservative thought that considered Islam to be 
an integral part of Turkish nationalism. This movement, which had grown dramatically 
with increases in Imam Hatip schools, combined elements of Islamist and Turkist thought 
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from intellectuals such as Ziya Golkalp and Mehmet Akif. Members of the movement 
saw no contradiction in celebrating an Ottoman-Islamic past and Turkish nationalism. In 
the late 1960s, the MHP, a right-wing party that promoted the racial superiority of Turks 
throughout the greater Turan region (Anatolia and Central Asia), began prominently 
featuring Islam in their discourse.322 Another important political movement that gained 
influence during the period was Necmettin Erbakan’s National Outlook Movement (Milli 
Gorus Hareketi, MGH), a nationalist Islamic movement that sought to restore Ottoman-
Islamic greatness and decrease western influence.323 The movement formed a string of 
political parties under Erbakan’s leadership that, like the DP in the 1950s, owed much 
their electoral success to close ties with the Naksibendi brotherhoods. The increasing 
alignment of Islamists and nationalists marked the unification of the Turkish right in the 
1970s. 
The synthesis of Turkish nationalism and Islam was also the core ideology of 
Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydinlar Ocagi), a group of conservative intellectuals that formed 
in 1970 as a reaction to leftist, separatist, and Islamist movements that were increasingly 
wreaking havoc amongst Turkish society. When violence reached extreme levels in 1980, 
the Turkish military intervened in national politics for the third time in 20 years, seizing 
control of the state, imprisoning thousands, and banning all existing political parties.324 
General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military administration, elected to adopt the 
Hearth’s “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as a guide to reshape the state’s approach toward 
religion to counter radicalism. The synthesis attempted to combine the two competing 
strains of Turkish nationalism: the secular narrative emphasizing pre-Islamic Turkish 
civilization, and the Ottoman-Islamic identity that Kemalist reforms had failed to 
suppress. Through education and political rhetoric, the state began advocating a 
reimagined national history in which ancient Turkish civilizations, which held family and 
the military as their most important institutions, converted to Islam upon settling in 
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Anatolia. The pre-Islamic Turkish values and Islam thus formed the dual pillars of a 
“national culture” that emphasized the importance of national unity and respect for 
authority.325 Military historians published volumes arguing that Ataturk was a pious 
Muslim whose secular reforms were only necessary to protect Islam from reactionary 
ideologies. In the new narrative, not only were Kemalism and religious identity 
compatible, but Islam provided the cement that held the nation together. In 1983, the 
military agreed to hand the state over to a democratically elected civilian government. 
With the Turkish left virtually non-existent in the wake of the coup, Turgut Ozal’s center-
right Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) formed a government despite the 
military’s objections.  
Under Ozal’s rule during the 1980s, Turkey underwent significant economic and 
political changes that fostered the increased influence of Islamic movements. He presided 
over Turkey’s dramatic economic liberalization, which promoted exports, stabilized 
inflation, and increased foreign investment.326 Consequently, many small and medium-
sized businesses throughout Turkey benefited, strengthening a pious new class of 
entrepreneurs, sometimes called the Anatolian Tigers.327 The state also enacted political 
reforms that gradually eased restrictions on religious associations, private education, and 
media. Ozal’s government likewise weakened the Kemalist monopoly within the state 
bureaucracy by hiring a more diverse group of civil servants, including many outwardly 
pious Muslims.328 The 1980s thus saw a dramatic increase in the opportunities for 
Turkey’s Islamic movements to expand their influence through government, business 
networks, schools, and independent media. In the years since, the most important of these 
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movements has been that of Fethullah Gulen, an imam heavily influenced by the late Said 
Nursi, Turkey’s most famous Sufi scholar. Beginning in 1966, Gulen and a small group 
of followers initially focused on providing secular and religious tutoring for students in 
the Izmir area. After his arrest for religious activities in the wake of the 1971 military 
coup, Gulen avoided politics, instead expanding his efforts to print media. Over the next 
few decades, the Gulen movement, sometimes known as Hizmet amongst its followers, 
expanded rapidly into a global movement that has assumed a prominent, although 
controversial, role in Turkish society.329 
In addition to enacting reforms that reshaped the county’s political landscape, 
Turgut Ozal was notable for his public emphasis on the importance of the Ottoman-
Islamic roots. A pious man heavily influenced by the Naksibendi Sufi order, Ozal became 
the first republican prime minister to travel to Mecca for the hajj.330 He also introduced 
iftar (breaking of the fast) dinners as official state ceremonies during Ramadan, a practice 
that would have been unimaginable only years before.331 Beyond his public 
demonstrations of piety, Ozal’s rhetoric often included strong neo-Ottoman themes. In a 
statement with implications both for foreign policy and Kurdish nationalism, Ozal 
referred to Islam as a great unifier:  
Just as it was during the Ottoman Empire, it is possible today to transcend 
ethnic differences through Islamic identity. I believe that the most 
powerful single constituting element of identity in this society is Islam. It 
is religion that blends Muslims of Anatolia and the Balkans. Therefore, 
Islam is a powerful cement of co-existence and cooperation among diverse 
Muslim groups . . . Being a Turk in the ex-Ottoman space means being a 
Muslim or vise versa.332 
In addition to highlighting the connection between Turkey and former Ottoman 
lands, Ozal’s quote also idealizes brotherhood amongst Muslims of various ethno-
linguistic groups. Ozal did not just envision stronger bonds with former Ottoman 
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Muslims. In 1992, he hosted representatives from throughout Central Asian for a Turkic 
summit and declared that the 21st century would be “the century of the Turks.”333 
Despite his emphasis on Muslim and Turkish unity, Ozal was not an anti-Western 
Islamist. He consistently advocated for Turkey’s full accession to the EU, partly to 
provide an external anchor to help counter statist policies of his domestic adversaries.334 
Similarly, he worked closely with the United States, which he favorably compared to the 
Ottoman Empire for its multiculturalism.335 Ozal’s neo-Ottomanism was not a vision of 
territorial expansion, but rather an aspiration of increasing regional influence and a 
reimagined, broader national identity that could help counter exclusive elements of 
Kemalist ideology and foster unity. 
In 1987, a referendum ended the ban of Necmettin Erbakan and other politicians, 
permitting the National Outlook leader to form another Islamist party. In the relatively 
liberal political sphere shaped by the Turkish-Islamist Synthesis and Ozal’s policies, the 
new Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) was able to gain prominence rapidly on a platform 
centered on social justice. After winning a plurality of votes in the 1995 parliamentary 
elections, the RP formed a coalition government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol 
Partisi, DYP) in which Erbakan would serve the first of rotating prime minister terms. 
Like Ozal before him, Erbakan sought to challenge Kemalist nationalism through 
emphasis on a shared Ottoman-Islamic history. When describing the concept of nation, 
party members consciously used the term milli as a religious reference to the 
communities of the Ottoman Empire.336 Like the Democratic Party in 1953, the RP 
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promoted a revival of celebrations surrounding May 29, the anniversary of Sultan 
Mehmed’s conquest of Istanbul.337  
After taking power, Erbakan’s first two foreign visits were to Libya and Iran, 
indicating a desire to build stronger ties with other Muslim states.338 By 1997, the 
military could no longer stomach what it viewed as Erbakan’s direct affronts to Kemalist 
concepts of secularism. On February 28th, the generals presented the prime minister with 
a list of means for curbing Islamist activities; when he refused to comply, the military 
applied pressure to coalition members until Erbakan was forced to step down.339 After 
the “postmodern coup,” the Constitutional Court closed the FP and again banned Erbakan 
from politics. Although two successor parties—the Virtue and Felicity Parties—followed, 
they never achieved substantial electoral support. 
Despite the attempts of the military to end Islamic activism, Turkey’s 
conservative base continued to demand political representation. In 2001, Abdullah Gul 
and a group of former RP politicians formed what would become Turkey’s most 
dominant political actor in recent years: the AKP. Having learned lessons from their 
previous experience, the new AKP leaders distanced themselves from the Islamic label, 
instead branding the new party as a conservative democratic party that respected the 
secular system. Capitalizing on voter dissatisfaction over the economy and government 
infighting, the AKP dominated the 2002 national elections, winning an outright majority 
in parliament. Under former Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who became prime 
minister in 2003, the AKP mobilized broad segments of the population by balancing an 
Islamic identity with pro-Western policies, including a commitment to EU accession. 
C. OTTOMAN-ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND KURDISH NATIONALISM 
For the first six decade of the republican era, official Turkish discourse on 
Kurdish nationalism was defined by denial. State leaders refused to acknowledge the 
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existence of the Kurdish ethnicity, and they heavily repressed any expression of 
Kurdishness. When violence broke out in the Southeast, Ankara downplayed any 
nationalist objectives, instead blaming the insurrections on socioeconomic problems or 
reactionary backwardness. Virtually all Turkish politicians adhered to this narrative until 
1983, when Ozal became the first Turkish leader to break many important taboos 
surrounding the problem. He claimed Kurdish ancestry, admitted the state had made 
mistakes in the past, and promised a “quest for a serious model for solving the Kurdish 
problem in a manner that goes beyond police measures.”340 He even went as far as to 
suggest that the introduction of a federal system might provide a solution.341 The 
discourse melded well with Ozal’s neo-Ottoman rhetoric that Islam formed a crucial—
and unifying—aspect of national identity. Despite public statements indicating he was 
adopting a new approach to the Kurdish question, it was under Ozal’s tenure that the 
armed forces enacted some of the harshest measures of the anti-terror campaign in the 
Southeast.342 This dichotomy highlighted the limits Turkey’s civilian governments have 
had to observe under the Kemalist tutelage of the military.  
Although Ozal was not an Islamist, his discourse was indicative of a common 
critique of Kemalism that has been articulated by many pious citizens. In their view, the 
excessive promotion of Turkish nationalism, rather than unifying the country, has fueled 
Kurdish separatism. As a member of an Islamist party wrote, “the republic’s militant 
secularism and Kemalist suppression of the country’s Islamic heritage had antagonized 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin” by ending the unifying bond of Islamic 
brotherhood.343 In the early 1990s, the Islamist RP loudly echoed this critique in its party 
platform, attributing the problem to “the materialist and racist character of Turkish 
nationalism.”344 Party supporters felt strongly that the RP could help solve the problem 
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by instead appealing to an Ottoman-Islamic identity that would be more inclusive to 
Kurds.345 Although the RP had strongly advocated recognizing Kurdish identity and 
language rights, these calls ended completely once Erbakan became prime minister in 
1995. Again, the military had curbed the challenge to their policies on the matter.346 
Despite the armed forces’ restrictions on the discourses surrounding the Kurdish 
question, it nonetheless concurred that Islamic identity could potentially serve to counter 
separatism and radical ideologies. This belief had motivated Kenen Evren’s promotion of 
the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis following the 1980 coup, a move that had required a 
delicate reconciliation with official Kemalist ideology. By claiming Islamic identity as a 
component of Turkishness, the state could use religion as an instrument not only to foster 
a shared Islamic identity, but also to denigrate Kurdish nationalists amongst pious 
citizens. In 1981, the military administration ordered the formation of new department 
within the government’s religious affairs bureau charged with organizing conferences and 
lectures in the Southeast that preached about the anti-religious ideology of the PKK.347 
The army also has used helicopters to distribute flyers citing Qur’anic verses to implore 
Kurds to take up arms against terrorist groups.348 The state’s hopes of a religious Kurdish 
backlash were realized when the militant Islamist group Hizbullah (no connection to the 
Shi’ite group of Lebanon) began a series of attacks on the PKK in 1991. While it is 
uncertain if the state helped in the formation of the group, authorities clearly allowed 
Hizbullah to carry out its violent campaign unencumbered until 2000, when the armed 
forces finally crushed it.349 Overall, the Turkish state has traditionally viewed the 
promotion of Islam as a means to both quell Kudish nationalist sentiment and mobilize a 
counter movement.  
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1. AKP  
The AKP, which has now presided over a majority government for an 
unprecedented eleven years, has shown an ambivalent approach to the Kurdish question. 
While Prime Minister Erdogan has at times echoed traditional denials of the problem, he 
has more recently modeled himself as a democratic reformer committed to human rights. 
What has remained constant, however, has been a belief that Ottoman-Islamic identity 
will help solve the problem. The seemingly haphazard evolution of the party’s discourse, 
much like previous political actors, has been heavily shaped both by the tutelage of the 
armed forces and the requirements of electoral politics. In the last several years, however, 
the AKP has managed to finally undermine military authority and consolidate civilian 
power. Because of the AKP’s unrivaled stature, the party’s contributions to the discourse 
on resolving the Kurdish question are worthy of further analysis. 
In the run-up to the 2002 national elections, many Kurds supported the AKP in 
hopes the new party would address their demands for increased rights. This support was 
based largely on two factors. First, the AKP had positioned itself as an anti-system party 
that would challenge the state’s Kemalist ideology that denied Kurdish identity. Bulent 
Arinc, who would later become deputy prime minister, summarized the party’s strategy 
of uniting the periphery when he said, “we need to steer ourselves from the margins of 
society and become a party that can be trusted by everyone.”350 Second, the party’s 
strong Islamic roots were attractive to many of the pious voters of the Kurdish southeast. 
Like the National Outlook parties before it, AKP did especially well amongst Kurdish 
voters with connections to the Naksibendi and Nurcu Islamic movements.351 Despite the 
support from the southeast regions, the AKP platform included little in the way of 
specific policies related to the Kurdish problem. Minding the requirements of EU 
accession, the party statement merely read, “cultural diversities within the framework of 
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the democratic state should prevail.”352 Also being conscious not to offend Kemalist 
ideology, the party did remain committed to maintaining Turkish as the official language 
of the state and education.353 
After taking office in 2002, AKP presided over the passage of several legislative 
reform packages intended to harmonize Turkish law with the standards required for EU 
accession. These included the constitutional abolition of the death penalty and State 
Security Courts.354 Most notably, the reforms included provisions allowing broadcasting 
and private education in languages other than Turkish “provided they do not compromise 
constitutional principles.”355 While the packages represented significant progress for 
Turkey in improving democratic standards, the new AKP government had played little 
role in their drafting.  
Aside from passing the harmonization packages started by the previous 
administration, the party was initially reluctant to pursue any rhetoric that deviated from 
traditional policies on the Kurdish question. This was likely due to fears amongst party 
leaders that such a policy initiative could trigger a backlash from the still-powerful 
military leadership. Similarly, the AKP could not afford to alienate the large percentage 
of its constituents with nationalist beliefs.356 When asked about the Kurdish problem in 
2002, Erdogan replied, “I say there is no such problem. We are all from Turkey.”357 In 
April 2005, less than a year after the PKK called off their five-year cease fire, Erdogan 
again refused to articulate the ethnic aspect of the conflict: “There isn’t a Kurdish 
problem in Turkey; it is a fictitious problem. We approach this issue within the 
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framework of citizenship . . . We do not make distinctions between [ethnic] groups such 
as Turks, Kurds, Laz, Georgian, and Abkhaz.”358 
In 2005, Erdogan shifted his rhetoric on the Kurdish question to reflect a new 
approach. During a landmark visit to Diyarbakir in August, Erdogan declared, “the 
Kurdish problem is my problem,” marking a bold departure from his earlier denials.  He 
also promised, “We will solve all problems through democracy,” and pledged to 
introduce a “citizenship law.”359 In the speech, the prime minister not only admitted the 
problem, but also acknowledged a primary grievance of many Kurdish nationalists: the 
constitution’s declaration that all citizens are members of the Turkish nation, a definition 
many Kurds find as denigrating to their ethnic identity. Later in the year, Erdogan again 
addressed the topic by referring to the concept of a unifying supra-identity: “The Turk 
should be able to say that he is a Turk, the Kurd should be able to say he is a Kurd . . . but 
the supra-identity of all of us is the same, being citizens of the Turkish Republic.”360 By 
referring to “citizens of the Turkish Republic” instead of “Turks,” Erdogan again 
indicated his preference for a constitution free of ethnic terminology.361 Baskin Oran 
argues that Erdogan’s language intentionally evoked citizenship under the Ottoman 
Empire, in which a variety of sub-identities—Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, 
Armenian—all existed under the supra-identity of Ottoman citizenship.362  
Soon after Erdogan began the discussion of constitutional reform, political 
constraints soon thwarted him.  The general staff, incensed by Erdogan’s critique of the 
official concept of Turkishness, publicly warned that these debates could “endanger the 
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state’s unitary structure, harming its integrity and unity.”363 These words were a reminder 
that the military stood ready to again intervene in national politics if the AKP did not 
soften their rhetoric on Kurdish identity. The party also faced a popular swell of Turkish 
nationalist sentiment in the wake of a new wave of PKK terror attacks in 2005. In the 
face of these events, the AKP reconsidered its promises of reform and reverted to rhetoric 
reminiscent of its first years in office. Only months after his groundbreaking Diyarbakir 
speech, Erdogan echoed official Kemalist ideology when he declared “there is one state, 
one nation, one flag.”364 For the next few years, the party faced threats of closure for 
policies perceived as threatening to the secular state, and party speeches on the Kurdish 
question remained largely nationalist in tone. After surviving the “e-memorandum” and 
constitutional crises, AKP leaders announced a new commitment solving the problem 
through democratic means in 2009.  The “Kurdish Opening” faced sharp criticism from 
opposition parties, however, and popular opinion turned against the initiative after a 
group of pardoned PKK fighters triumphantly celebrated their reentry into the country.365 
The overtly contrasting tone of Erdogan’s speeches during these years reflected the 
political obstacles to the party’s goal of applying its neo-Ottoman vision to the Kurdish 
question. 
While Erdogan’s discourse on the Kurdish question has evolved, he has been 
consistent in his assertion that a stronger sense of Ottoman-Islamic identity will improve 
the chances of a peaceful resolution. This approach appeals first to the collective memory 
of the Ottoman past, during which Turks and Kurds were all members of the same 
Muslim millet. It also references Islamic traditions that encourage loyalty to the 
ummah—the collective group of all Muslims worldwide—over any tribe, ethnicity, or 
nation. AKP leaders have regularly alluded to Islamic brotherhood when discussing the 
Kurdish issue. In a 2005 speech, when asked about the Kurdish question, Erdogan stated, 
“In our country, ethnic components of the population are unified by shared Islamic 
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bonds.”366 When he was later asked if these Islamic bonds should form a national supra-
identity, he differentiated between supra-identity and shared culture: 
In Turkey there are almost 30 different ethnic groups all belonging to 
Islam. In such a country religion is the cement [emphasis added]. The 
supra-identity is, as I said previously, ‘citizenship of [the] Turkish 
Republic’. Religion is the cement, our most important unifying element. 
Mustafa Kemal has similar statements.367  
Erdogan’s statement, which demonstrates the multi-faceted ideology the party has 
adopted on the issue, includes a variety of contrasting elements: an allusion to a civic 
definition of citizenship, a reference to shared Islamic values, and an assertion of secular 
legitimacy through a reference to Ataturk.  
AKP’s promotion of a neo-Ottoman national identity is not based on a desire to 
literally discard the construct of the nation-state. Instead, it offers the country’s citizens—
both Turks and Kurds—a shared identity that is free from the political baggage of 
Kemalist concepts of nationalism. Given the country’s political landscape, this represents 
a significant political gamble on the part of the AKP. As discussed in Chapter III, it is 
only due to the party’s defanging of the Turkish Armed Forces that much of this 
discussion has been possible. In the run-up to the 2011 national elections, Erdogan made 
a remarkable statement in Diyarbakir: 
We are all the descendants of the great soldiers of great leader Selahaddin 
Eyyubi [a Kurdish Muslim who established the Ayyubid dynasty], who 
conquered Palestine and Jerusalem . . . I am against both Turkish and 
Kurdish nationalisms [emphasis added]. All the Kurds and Turks are my 
brothers . . . We turn our faces towards the same qibla [the Kaaba in 
Mecca, the holiest place of Islam].”368  
The thought of a Turkish prime minister expressing contempt for Turkish 
nationalism, whether the term implied an ethnic concept or not, would have been 
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absolutely unthinkable a decade earlier. After the revelations of the Oslo talks and the 
announcement of the 2013 Imrali meetings, Erdogan again reiterated that ethno-
nationalism must be discarded: “In this process, no one should oppose us with Kurdish or 
Turkish nationalisms . . . Whoever promotes ethnic nationalism is one engrossed in 
aberration, turmoil, and disorder.”369 These bold statements, definitive indicators the 
AKP no longer feared military intervention, were likely intended to gauge and shape 
public reaction to the AKP’s draft constitution, which reportedly will eliminate any 
references to the term “Turkish nation.”370 
The circuitous arc of the AKP’s discourse on the Kurdish question demonstrates 
the difficulties of reconciling party ideology with the realities of Turkish politics. While 
the party came to power largely through its religious values and counter-system image, 
party leaders initially avoided statements that recognized Kurdish identity claims. As the 
party gradually consolidated power over the military, Erdogan began questioning existing 
concepts of national identity. In place of ethnic Turkishness, the prime minister has 
advocated a civic concept of citizenship and a renewed focus on shared Ottoman-Islamic 
values. These pronouncements alone will not solve the problem: Turkish nationalists still 
remain skeptical of granting identity rights, while many Kurds will only be satisfied once 
more concrete democratic reforms are announced. Nonetheless, the discourse of the 
country’s dominant political actor have helped pave the way for the difficult negotiations 
ahead.  
2. The Gulen Movement 
Like the AKP, Fethullah Gulen sees a shared Ottoman-Islamic identity as playing 
a critical role in resolving the Kurdish question. The Gulen movement has become an 
increasingly influential actor in Turkish society thanks to its international network of 
media outlets, schools, and NGOs. While the movement had been largely silent on the 
Kurdish issue for many years, it has lately contributed significantly to the discourse on 
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solving the problem. A significant portion of the movement’s rhetoric has centered on the 
promotion of Islamic values and nostalgia for the Ottoman era, during which Turks and 
Kurds coexisted within the Muslim millet. Since 2008, however, members of the Gulen 
movement have increasingly gone beyond traditional refrains of “Islam is the cement.” 
Instead, they have advocated for important democratic reforms that, although 
unimaginable just a decade ago, have increased the chances for a peaceful resolution to 
the Kurdish question. 
Although some staunch secularists have characterized the Gulen movement as an 
Islamist organization, the group has made efforts to operate within the boundaries set by 
the secular elite. While Erbakan’s National Outlook movement sought to take control of 
the state institutions and impose top-down reforms, Gulen has focused on gradually 
increasing the role of Islam throughout society from the bottom up.371 For the first few 
decades of its existence, the movement thus avoided public politics and showed 
deference to state authority.372 Despite his attempts to avoid confrontation with the 
Kemalist elite, Gulen and his followers came under heavy state scrutiny following the 
1997 “postmodern coup.” After revelations that the former imam had directed his 
followers to quietly infiltrate state institutions, a state prosecutor indicted Gulen for 
attempting to undermine the state through his “illegal network.”373 Under the guise of 
requiring health care, Gulen fled to the United States, where he remains today. In the 
wake of his showdown, Gulen took a more involved role in Turkish politics in an effort 
to chip away at the general staff’s hegemony in state affairs.374 Some observers have 
argued that Gulen sympathizers within the bureaucracy were a driving force behind the 
Ergenkon and Sledgehammer coup trials, which have ended the era of military 
interventions and weakened Turkey’s secular elite.375 
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Because Gulen has become increasingly vocal in Turkey’s political sphere, his 
public statements on ethno-nationalism are hugely important for the resolution of the 
Kurdish question. For years, many observers—Turks and Kurds alike—have viewed the 
Gulen movement as statist and nationalist. As evidence, these writers have pointed to 
Gulen’s promotion of the benefits of a uniquely “Turkish Islam,”376 the ubiquity of 
Turkish language and symbols in many of the movement’s international schools,377 and 
the hosting of an international Olympiad that awards prizes to foreign children for 
performances in Turkish.378 While there is no doubt that Gulen is more of a Turkish 
nationalist than many of the country’s Islamist actors, his writing and statements indicate 
that he has eased away from traditional Kemalist narratives that portray Kurdish identity 
as a threat to the state.  
Gulen’s writings make it clear that he shares Said Nursi’s belief that there are two 
forms of nationalism: negative and positive.379 In his seminal work Risale-i Nur, Nursi 
decried negative nationalism as a form of “racism or chauvinism” that had led to the 
breakup of the Ottoman Empire.380 He considered positive nationalism as solidarity 
based on shared language, religion, and territory. Even in the positive form, however, 
Nursi warned that nationalism should never replace Islamic unity; doing so would be “as 
foolish as replacing the diamonds in a citadel with its stones.”381 Referencing Nuri’s 
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passages, Gulen labels nationalism as a great danger to belief and advises, “in Islam, it is 
the unity around faith that abolishes the clan and nationality-oriented concepts.”382  
In recent discourse on the Kurdish question, members of the Gulen movement 
have similarly focused on the importance of Ottoman-Islamic identity while downplaying 
traditional concepts of ethnic Turkish nationalism. Ihsan Yilmaz, a prominent columnist 
of Gulen’s Zaman newspaper, wrote an article in 2013 entitled “I am Not a Nationalist,” 
in which he argued that while the official concept of Turkish nationalism—milliyetcilik—
may have been intended as a civic concept of citizenship, it soon morphed into an 
exclusionary concept based on ethnicity. Believing this new form of nationalism to be a 
source of many problems, he stated, “practicing Muslim Turks must criticize themselves 
since they failed, at least discursively, to accept and fight the fact that non-Turks and 
their cultures, languages, etc. also deserve the same respect and recognition from the 
state.”383 Gulen has similarly warned that Turkish nationalism could enflame the conflict, 
writing,  
Today, already the government does not have a choice but to let Kurds 
have their birthright. All who care about our country and our people 
should remain calm and exercise restraint against agitations and 
provocations, and avoid retaliatory actions. This problem cannot be 
resolved by nationalistic reactions and slogans, “Martyrs are immortal, 
and the homeland is indivisible.”384  
After the announcement of the Imrali talks in 2013, Gulen’s response to the events was 
highly anticipated. Speaking to an Iraqi Kurdish newspaper, Gulen offered public 
encouragement for the peace process and advocated equal rights for all citizens in the 
tradition of the prophet Muhammad. Most significantly, Gulen declared the time has 
come for the granting of a major Kurdish demand: “Education in mother tongue should 
be accepted. The state needs to be fair to all of its citizens. After accepting this, then we 
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will fix the problems that come along with it.”385 Given the movement’s statist 
reputation, the recent discourse of Gulen and his followers has been remarkable for its 
critique of Turkish nationalism and its framing of Kurdish cultural demands as 
fundamental human rights. 
Gulen believes that ethno-nationalism can be countered through education 
stressing Islamic values and a shared Ottoman past.386 The movement has thus opened a 
large number of its successful schools in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq since 
2007.387 While the schools adhere to state curricula guidelines, the pious instructors 
stress “a nostalgia for the Ottoman past” and seek to instill religious values through 
“exemplary behavior and altruistic idealism for their students.”388 Because the schools 
often represent the best educational opportunities in the region, they have been popular 
amongst families from a variety of backgrounds. Said one Diyabakir academic, “It is 
simply the best education you can get . . . People are falling over each other to get their 
kids into these schools, whether or not they like Fethullah Gulen.”389 Yavuz argues that 
Gulen believes education “is not about affirming one tradition and identity in opposition 
to another, but rather teaching in a way to indicate their connections and similarities.”390 
Not all actors have approved of the Gulen movement’s attempts to counter ethno-
nationalism. To many in the Kurdish movement, Gulen has been an agent of the Kemalist 
state that seeks to placate and assimilate Kurds.391 A Kurdish nationalist intellectual 
summarized this line of critique, saying, “Gulen tries to assimilate Kurds by emphasizing 
the Ottoman ideology in his school, causing many Kurds to see themselves as [Ottoman] 
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rather than as [Kurdish].”392 Altan Tan, a BDP deputy who participated in the Imrali 
talks, also took aim at Gulenists in 2010, writing, “And they say in the name of Islam, 
‘Yes, let us help you improve your belief but forget about your identity.’”393 Other critics 
of the movement argue that if Gulen and other religious leaders had cared about Kurdish 
citizens, he would have spoken up far sooner on language and education rights.394 
Kurdish nationalist opposition to the movement has reached extreme levels in recent 
years, with Gulen schools in the Southeast becoming a regular target of bomb and gun 
attacks.395 Caught in the middle are many average Kurds, who have ambivalent views of 
the organization. One lawyer said, “I know the movement is the rival organization to 
Kurdish nationalism. However, I support the education activities of the movement . . . I 
think stressing Islam as a shared identity is important.”396  
The Gulen movement’s contributions to the dialogue on the Kurdish question 
have not been limited to appeals to brotherhood and educational endeavors. One of the 
most critical contributions of the movement has been the promotion of a wide variety of 
civil associations that have advocated for increased dialogue on the topic. These 
organizations are notable not only for their ideas, but also for bringing together religious 
and secular intellectuals. One of the most prominent of these associations is the Journalist 
and Writers Foundation (GYV), which has organized a series of conferences that have 
sought to “build a new social contract, stressing the need for tolerance and pluralism in 
Turkish society.”397 The most notable of these is an annual symposium known as the 
Abant Platform, in which intellectuals, journalists, politicians, and legal experts meet to 
discuss important social issues. The 2008 conference, which pre-dated the AKP’s 
Kurdish Opening by a year, was dedicated to the Kurdish question, and the attendees co-
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authored a statement that took a remarkably liberal stance on the topic. While rejecting 
violence as a solution, the statement denounced “assimilation policies toward the Kurds,” 
advocated the recognition of “all social, cultural, and political rights,” recommended a 
“comprehensive amnesty law,” and argued that mother-tongue education “is an 
indispensible human right.”398 While the 2012 meeting focused on rewriting Turkey’s 
constitution, the Kurdish question featured prominently in the discussion. The platform 
statement called for a new definition of citizenship that would not reference ethnicity and 
reiterated the importance of education in one’s native language.399  Although the 
conference statements did reference Kurds as “brothers,” they did not appeal to religious 
ties whatsoever. Instead, they focused on democratization and specific steps for conflict 
resolution. The activities of the GYV, which considers Fethullah Gulen as its honorary 
chairman,400 is evidence that Turkey’s most important Islamic movement has expanded 
its discourse beyond religious solidarity to include meaningful policy recommendations 
that could contribute to the peace process. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite state secularist policies, Turkish elites have instrumentalized Ottoman-
Islamic identity to counter internal dissidence since 1960. This was most evident in the 
adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis by the military administration of the early 
1980s, which sought to counter the ideologies of left-wing radicals, Islamists, and 
Kurdish nationalists by emphasizing the role of Islam in national identity. This policy 
opened the door for Turgut Ozal’s liberalizing reforms and the expansion of political 
opportunities for a variety of new associations including Islamic social movements and 
political parties. Today, two such organizations—the AKP and the Gulen movement—
dominate much of the political discourse on the Kurdish question. 
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The AKP received significant political support from Kurdish voters in 2002, 
thanks in part to a sense that the party shared Kurdish activists’ disdain for the hegemony 
of official Kemalist ideology. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Erdogan failed to articulate a 
coherent policy on the issue during his first term for two reasons. First, the Turkish 
Armed Forces were still playing an important role in shaping state security policy. 
Second, a large percentage of the Turkish public views Kurdish identity claims as a threat 
to the republic. These political restrictions persuaded Erdogan to buy himself time 
through rhetoric focusing on the shared Islamic bonds between Turks and Kurds, but the 
discourse did not diminish nationalist violence. After the AKP undercut the political 
power of the military, it had removed the first of the two roadblocks to the peace process. 
Since then, the AKP has attempted to persuade its constituents that ethno-nationalism, 
whether Turkish or Kurdish, will only perpetuate the conflict. Instead, the country should 
become comfortable, according the Erdogan, with a civic national identity based on 
citizenship, not Turkishness. As the party looks to reframe a new national identity, it has 
consciously evoked nostalgia for the greatness and pluralism of the Ottoman era.  
Fethullah Gulen long assumed a relatively accommodating stance vis-à-vis the 
Kemalist elite, and has generally avoided publically weighing in on policy matters. 
Nonetheless, his socio-political movement ranks as a major political force thanks to its 
media empires, network of international schools, and sympathizers within the state 
bureaucracy. Like the AKP, Gulen has long believed a renewed emphasis on Ottoman-
Islamic values through education will foster unity and decrease separatism. While some 
critics have labeled Gulen as overly nationalist, in recent years the movement has 
facilitated—through media outlets and civil associations—discussions on redefining 
Turkey’s national identity. Much of this discourse includes critical debate on ethno-
nationalism and suggestions for specific democratization policies that go beyond those of 
the AKP. These ideas were previously expressed primarily within liberal segments of 
society, but today they feature prominently in the country’s top newspapers, including 
those targeted at a conservative audience. Given the Gulen movement’s broad influence, 
its recent discourse on the Kurdish question has certainly helped the country work 
towards a consensus on the importance of identity and equality. 
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As Turkey’s citizens prepares to have some very difficult discussions on the 
Kurdish question, the increased focus on Ottoman-Islamic identity features prominently. 
Like other political actors before them, the AKP and Gulen Movement have 
demonstrated that militant nationalists will not lay down their arms because of banal 
assertions that “Islam is the cement.” At this juncture, however, it is not Kurdish 
nationalists that are the target audience for those heralding the importance of Ottoman-
Islamic identity. Rather, the AKP and Gulen are hoping that it will be Turkish nationalists 
that will respond to this dialogue by looking critically at their long-held assumptions 
about national identity, citizenship, and democratic rights. The AKP has already 
successfully ended the military’s role in shaping state security policy. It now remains to 
be seen if the party can also convince the Turkish public that some concessions—
language rights, electoral reform, redefined citizenship, or even a form of autonomy—
may be helpful democratic reforms that will not threaten the integrity of the state. 
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This thesis makes three main assertions about Turkey’s long struggle with 
Kurdish nationalism. First, increased political opportunities have diversified and 
moderated the field of Kurdish activists, thereby increasing the likelihood that moderates 
may eventually challenge the PKK’s hegemony of the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
Second, the dramatically diminished political influence of the Turkish Armed Forces has 
removed the hardline restrictions on political measures aimed at addressing Kurdish 
grievances. Third, through their critiques of ethno-nationalism, politicians asserting 
Ottoman-Islamic values have encouraged a reevaluation of national identity, citizenship, 
and human rights. I argue that these changes in Turkey’s social and political landscape 
have all improved the chances that a negotiated settlement will eventually end the PKK’s 
long and bloody insurgency. While this thesis has focused squarely on how domestic 
factors at the national level have shaped the prospects for peace, further research should 
be devoted to organizational dynamics within the PKK itself and the importance of 
international power shifts, including the increasing autonomy of Kurds in Turkey’s 
neighboring countries. 
Although many observers are hopeful that the recent Imrali negotiations and 
ceasefire might be the first steps to a peace agreement, this thesis has instead focused on 
large-scale shifts in political opportunity structures, civil-military relations, and national 
identity that hopefully will lay the foundation for successful conflict resolution in the 
long term. In the near term, however, I contend there are several reasons to be skeptical 
that the current process will result in a lasting peace. First, the conflict has already 
witnessed the failures of four halts in fighting.401 The most notorious example occurred 
in 1993, when the PKK’s first declared ceasefire ended after militants executed 33 
unarmed Turkish soldiers and four teachers near Bingol.402 Conversely, the PKK has 
accused the Turkish Armed Forces of ambushing its forces in violation of other previous 
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agreements.403 In the months since the 2013 ceasefire, sporadic PKK attacks and 
kidnappings have continued, while many Kurds claim the military has continued to 
reinforce its positions in the southeast.404 If continued provocations trigger a fatal 
confrontation, the entire process could derail.  
Second, leaders on both sides appear to lack trust in their counterparts. While 
BDP leaders have recently claimed that 80 percent of PKK fighters have left Turkey 
since the withdrawal began in May, Erdogan has angrily protested that only 20 percent 
have departed.405 In addition, the government was incensed by reports that the PKK has 
recently increased its recruiting efforts406 and has permitted the formation of a civil 
defense agency in Cizre.407 There are signs of growing frustrations on the side of the 
Kurdish nationalists, as well. Claiming that the AKP has been stalling the peace process, 
BDP leader Selahattin Demirtas recently threatened war if the AKP did not pass its 
promised reform package by October 15.408 Cemil Bayik, the new co-chair of the KCK, 
complained, “We’ve amply fulfilled what was up to us. [But] the process cannot go on 
like this. The state has brought the process to the brink of a deadlock.”409  
Third, political actors on both sides are feeling excluded from the process and are 
skeptical of the motivations of the primary negotiators. CHP leaders, while offering tepid 
support for the withdrawal, have accused the AKP of withholding information from other 
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politicians and the public.410 The opposition party also resents the privileged role Ocalan 
has played in the negotiations, while they have been excluded entirely.411 Devlet Bahceli, 
leader of the right-wing MHP, is dead-set against the entire enterprise, and has warned 
that Erdogan was “negotiating to divide Turkey.”412 There are also signs of possible 
infighting amongst those on the other side of the table. After a transcript of an early 
Imrali meeting was leaked to the press, some argued BDP deputies were attempting to 
sabotage the negotiations to protest their minimal role in the process.413 In July, the 
PKK/KCK organization shuffled its leadership, with Bayik and Bese Hozat taking co-
chair positions, while former chair Murat Karayilan took over as head of the People’s 
Defense Force (Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG), the PKK’s military wing. Some have 
speculated that the change may have resulted from internal disagreements over the peace 
process.414 
Lastly, Turkish citizens do not strongly support the current process or have faith 
that it will succeed. In an April poll, when asked about the negotiations, 51 percent of 
respondents replied that they did not back the initiative, while only 37 were in favor.415 
When asked if they approved of Ocalan’s role as a negotiator, only 22 percent found it to 
be acceptable; even amongst AKP voters, the portion was only 30 percent.416 
Respondents also appeared to object to the political dealings underlying the process, with 
62 percent expressing disapproval of a potential collaboration between the AKP and BDP 
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on a new constitution.417 Similarly, of the political concessions on the negotiation table—
house arrest, amnesty, autonomy, and a federal system—none were supported by more 
than 22 percent of the public.418 Most troubling, only 28 percent of respondents believed 
that the process would result in the PKK laying down their arms.419 Given that the AKP 
will be competing in three elections—regional, parliamentary, and presidential—in 2014, 
party leaders have significant incentives to either stall or abandon the unpopular process 
altogether.  
In addition to concerns over its chances for success, I argue that the current 
negotiations may be counterproductive to long-term chances for a peaceful resolution. 
Rather than attempting to empower and engage moderates within the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, the Imrali talks have strengthened Ocalan’s position as the primary 
representative of Kurdish activism. Although the BDP may not qualify as a moderate 
actor based on its ties to political violence, the party still would have been a preferable 
public negotiating partner. Instead, the BDP’s parroting of Ocalan’s demands for release 
will only perpetuate the party’s role as the puppet of the PKK. When the current talks 
break down, the Turkish public will have simply grown more cynical about the priorities 
of Kurdish activists. In the long term, Ankara should look to discredit Ocalan as an 
obstacle to Kurdish demands for democratic rights while allowing the political growth of 
moderate alternative Kurdish actors.   
Although the current peace negotiations face significant challenges, Turkey has 
made meaningful strides toward resolving its Kurdish question over the last decade. 
Kurdish citizens have gained important cultural rights and political opportunities that 
permit them to assert their ethnic identity while advocating for further democratization. 
In addition, the government has finally asserted civilian control over the armed forces, 
opening the door to addressing legitimate grievances through political measures. Lastly, 
the resurgence of Ottoman-Islamic political actors has called into question exclusive 
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concepts of national identity that have been long an obstacle to equality. Although the 
current government has recently strayed from its commitment to democracy in favor of 
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